DO THE DEMOCRATS WANT TO REBUILD IRAQ?

PETER BEINART, THE EDITORS

HOW CLARK WON KOSOVO

SPENCER ACKERMAN

THE NEW REPUBLIC

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



DEMOCRACY'S MANY FATHERS

Why Freedom Isn't a Western Invention

AMARTYA SEN



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THE NEW REPUBLIC
A JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND THE ARTS

OCTOBER 6, 2003 WASHINGTON, D.C. ISSUE 4,629 VOLUME 229

COVER STORY

Amartya Sen **28** **Democracy and Its Global Roots** Democracy developed most fully in the West, but freedom is not a Western invention—which is why we are right to try to bring freedom and democracy to the rest of the world. An analytical look at the full history of the democratic idea.

POLITICS & THE WORLD

4 **CORRESPONDENCE** Kate Michelman v. Sacha Zimmerman on abortion and science, &c.

Peter Beinart **6** **TRB | Cheap Shots** President Bush has finally recognized that rebuilding Iraq takes money. Why have Democrats forgotten?

The Editors **7** **Fast Track** France, the Iraqi Governing Council, and the Democratic presidential candidates are wrong. The danger isn't that the United States will stay in Iraq too long. It's that we'll leave too soon.

8 **NOTEBOOK** William Safire's Hillary fantasies, &c.

Michael Crowley **10** **On the Hill: Memory Loss** On the stump, Dick Gephardt says he tried to stop President Bush from going to war without the United Nations. The historical record suggests the opposite.

Spencer Ackerman **11** **Falsely Accused** Conservatives dismiss Wesley Clark as Clinton's general. Actually, the two men's foreign policy instincts couldn't be more different.

Dina Temple-Raston **14** **Kigali Dispatch: Quiet Riot** How guilt and Francophobia led Washington to bless a sham election in Rwanda.

Michael Levi **16** **Enabler** The International Atomic Energy Agency has found overwhelming evidence Iran lied about its nuclear program. So why won't it act on its own report?

Michelle Cottle **19** **Cajun Dressing** Billy Tauzin may be the most shameless K Street shill in Congress. But he's also such a fun-loving, fast-talking bayou charmer that almost no one cares.

Martin Peretz **38** **CAMBRIDGE DIARIST | The Ambassador**

BOOKS & THE ARTS

Stanley Kauffmann **24** **FILMS | Odd Gratifications** *Lost in Translation* is satisfyingly poignant; Leni Riefenstahl's death evokes no tears.

David Hajdu **25** **MUSIC | This Year's Model** *North,* Elvis Costello's twenty-fourth album, is the latest innovation of a brave, mercurial career.

David Constantine **32** **POEM** | *Enclave*

Lynn Hunt **35** **Great Reception** *George Washington's False Teeth: An Unconventional Guide to the Eighteenth Century* by Robert Darnton

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GO WEST

IT WAS DECENT OF FRANKLIN FOER to acknowledge in "Founding Fakers" that it was the *National Review* that published my exposé of Jonas Savimbi as less than the Thomas Jefferson of Africa in 1989. However, that suggests that conservatives were less duped than Foer maintains. I agree with Foer when he argues that the United States should support whomever it needs to in foreign entanglements and have no illusions. This chimes with the concluding sentiment of my report from Angola.

But it really is unfair to saddle the conservative movement with responsibility for America's 1980s support for Afghanistan's Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the murderous fanatic who spent more time fighting other mujahedin than the Soviets. On the contrary, it was conservatives who exposed Hekmatyar's abuses. His favored treatment was not the result of any ideological self-deception in the West but of the support he enjoyed from radical senior officers in Pakistan's intelligence service, which distributed the U.S. assistance.

Also, the experience of Central Europe's transition from totalitarianism to democracy would suggest that exiles—contrary to what Foer says about Ahmed Chalabi in Iraq—can be useful in healing their countries. It is impossible, for example, to underestimate the role that the West German civil service has played in the transformation of East Germany. Lithuania's former president, Valdas Adamkus, and Latvia's current head of state, Vaira Vike Freiberga, both spent many years in the United States and Canada and returned to their countries to bolster their democratic and Western orientation. Bulgaria's former king is doing his utmost to integrate his country with the West while serving as its democratically elected prime minister. May I say that I myself, in 1992, as a freshly returned exile and deputy defense minister, lobbied for Poland to join NATO.


AMERICAN CENSORSHIP RIGHT AND LEFT
JUSTICE, NOT COMPASSION, FOR LIBERIA
THE NEW REPUBLIC
FOUNDING FAKERS
How Rebel Leaders Are Duping the Right —Again
Franklin Foer

The essential nature of dictatorship, particularly one as brutal as Saddam Hussein's, is that it kills, imprisons, cows, corrupts, or forces into exile people with an independent mind—precisely the kind of people you need to construct a more decent society. Let us have no illusions, but let us also give a chance to people who at least have the experience of living in a successful modern democracy.

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A WOMB OF ONE'S OWN

IN TNR'S AUGUST 18 ISSUE, SACHA Zimmerman's article "Fetal Position" characterized NARAL Pro-Choice America as "ignoring the prospect of ectogenesis at [our] own peril." To the contrary, we are not ignoring ectogenesis; we instead are focused on more immediate and serious threats to the right to choose.

NARAL Pro-Choice America is committed to protecting the right to choose—including the right to choose childbirth—and we support technology that promotes safe and healthy pregnancies. However, we certainly oppose the manipulation of that technology to infringe on a woman's right to privacy, as in the scenario imagined by Zimmerman. The possibility that ectogenesis could ultimately be used to restrict women's access to abortion, though, pales in comparison with the more real and immediate threats presented by the Bush administration, Congress, and courts around the country, whose intrusions on reproductive liberty are anything but theoretical. A woman's right to choose depends most critically on the Supreme Court, the composition of which will be determined by the president who appoints the next justice or two.

Zimmerman reasoned that it would not invade a woman's constitutional right to privacy if the state compelled the harvest of her embryo for growth in an artificial womb, rather than allowing her to choose an abortion, "since removal of the fetus for implantation in an artificial womb need not be any more invasive than the abortion she was originally seeking." But the right to privacy that allows women to decide whether and when to have a child is based upon the personal nature of the decision, not the relative invasiveness of procedures. Indeed, as recently as 2000, the Court in *Stenberg* v. *Carhart* struck down Nebraska's attempt to ban certain safe abortion procedures in favor of other legally available procedures.

Zimmerman's other claim, that fetal viability would necessarily be altered by ectogenetic technology, is similarly questionable. Although fetal viability is indeed a critical dividing line when determining the constitutionality of state laws restricting abortion, courts have not defined viability based upon the outer limits of medical science.

We, and others in the pro-choice movement, always keep watch on interesting developments in the research laboratory. But we're maintaining our primary focus on where the real threats are found—in courtrooms, legislative chambers, and the Oval Office.

KATE MICHELMAN
President
Naral Pro-Choice America
Washington, D.C.

THE IRONY IS THAT, IF SCIENTISTS create an artificial womb and abortion becomes a "pre-birth"—where the embryo is implanted in an artificial womb—then it will cost hundreds of thousands of dollars to bring each embryo to term.

By and large, the pro-life cadre are the same group who don't support such large-scale social spending; would they be willing to spend millions per year on ectogenesis to save these embryos?

JOHN LYON
Austin, Texas

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





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Cheap Shots

TRB FROM WASHINGTON

A WEEK INTO HIS PRESIDENTial bid, Wesley Clark looks less like the Democrats' solution than another symptom of their basic problem. That problem is that much of the Democratic base still doesn't take national security seriously. Sure, Democrats know that most Americans don't trust the party to keep them safe. But they deny that this distrust has anything to do with prevailing Democratic ideology. The party, they reassure themselves, merely needs a tougher image.

And so Democrats keep trying to find new, ever more Rambo-like personas to proclaim essentially the same message. First, there was John Kerry, whose Vietnam heroism supposedly inoculated him against GOP attacks, his incoherent Iraq position notwithstanding. Now, there is General Clark. Maybe Clark does indeed have a proactive, coherent national security message. But, with his Kerry-esque, have-it-both-ways position on Iraq, he certainly hasn't articulated that message on the stump. And many of the Democrats who cheered Clark's entrance into the race don't particularly care; for them, Clark's resumé *is* the message. Once again, the Democrats are trying to solve an ideological problem with a biographical solution. It didn't work for decorated World War II flying ace George McGovern; it didn't work for Vietnam triple-amputee Max Cleland. And it won't work next fall. The voters—shocking as it may seem—actually care what the parties believe.

In fact, at the very moment Democrats are swooning over Clark, the party's views on Iraq are growing even more confused. Throughout the summer, Democrats rightly slammed the Bush administration for minimizing the difficulty of rebuilding Iraq. "It's been hide the ball every step of the way," fumed Senator Kent Conrad in July. "They've consistently understated the cost by a factor of several-fold." Two weeks later, Office of Management and Budget chief Joshua Bolten's refusal to estimate the costs of occupation led Senator Joseph Biden to ask, "When are you guys starting [sic] to be honest with us?"

Biden got his answer on September 7. In his speech that night, President Bush did what Democrats had been demanding: He abandoned the fiction that Iraq could be rebuilt on the cheap. His $87 billion request even included new money for Afghanistan, where Democrats had hammered his insufficient commitment to nation-building.

You'd think Democrats would have applauded the president's conversion, perhaps even claimed credit for it. Instead, leading Democrats responded to Bush's U-turn with one of their own. With the polls showing that a majority of Americans, and a huge majority of Democrats, don't want to spend more money on Iraq, prominent Democrats decided Bush was *too* committed to nation-building. Almost overnight, it was Democrats who wanted to reconstruct Iraq on the cheap.

Democrats support the $51 billion Bush has requested for Iraqi military operations. But they want him to separate that from the roughly $20 billion he has requested for rebuilding Iraq's hospitals, electrical grid, and police. Ask Democrats whether they support that latter request, and they give three responses, each more dishonest and opportunistic than the last.

The first response is that the Bush administration should be spending the money at home. As John Kerry said at the September 9 Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) debate, "If we can open firehouses in Baghdad, we can keep them open in the United States of America." Yes, if we repealed the tax cuts, perhaps we could. But that's not going to happen, so, in the real world, Democrats have to decide whether to support large sums for Iraqi nation-building, even though their constituents won't get the domestic spending they vastly prefer. At the end of the day, Kerry will probably vote yes. But his debate answer pandered to an audience that wanted to hear him say no.

The second response is that Democrats can't evaluate Bush's request without more information. At the CBC debate, John Edwards said he wouldn't vote yes "without the president telling us how much this is going to cost over the long term, how long we're going to be there, and who is going to share the cost with us." But this isn't a position; it's a dodge. We already know who is going to share the cost with us: almost nobody. Estimates suggest the Bush administration will receive roughly 10 percent of the international aid it wants for Iraq. That's awful—and at least partly the Bushies' fault. But, if anything, it's reason for Democrats—if they're serious about succeeding in Iraq—to demand *more* than $20 billion in U.S. aid. Edwards also wants to know "how much this is going to cost over the long term" and "how long we're going to be there." Those questions can't be fully answered, but, even if they could—House Democrats recently estimated the Iraq occupation would cost roughly $300–$400 billion over ten years—what difference would it make? Edwards has all the information he needs to make a decision on Bush's budget request right now. Liberal internationalism says he should vote yes; the Democratic base says he should vote no. And his demand for plans, estimates, and timetables is a device to avoid choosing between the two.

The third dodge is to equate reconstructing Iraq with lining Dick Cheney's pockets. "I will not support a dime to protect the profits of Halliburton in Iraq," proclaimed Bob Graham at the CBC debate. But, for better or worse, rebuilding Iraq and securing Halliburton's profits are now intimately connected, and it is not exactly a sign of foreign policy seriousness to propose abandoning the former in order to prevent the latter.

These three nonresponses to Bush's budget request expose the shallowness of what passes for Democratic national security doctrine. If Democrats had a distinct post–September 11, 2001, vision, it was partly that the war on terrorism required a Marshall Plan as well as a Truman Doctrine; we needed to build schools in the Muslim world, not just crack skulls. Yet, now, with the Bush administration finally recognizing that defeating terrorism requires making sure Iraqis have electricity and clean water, the Democratic presidential candidates are looking for any excuse to avoid saying yes. Pandering to public isolationism may make short-term political sense, but, in the long-term, it will simply confirm what many Americans already believe: that you can dress up the Democratic Party in whatever uniform you want, it still doesn't have a strategy for the defining challenge of our time.

PETER BEINART

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Fast Track

NO HONEST SUPPORTER of the Iraq war can deny that its primary rationale—disarming Saddam Hussein of his weapons of mass destruction—looks far less compelling today than it did in March. There was, however, another rationale: liberating the Iraqi people and creating a democratic state that offers a new model of political development to the Arab world. And so the measure of the war's success is now the economic, political, and social development of post-Saddam Iraq. Victory would offer proof to the Muslim world that Americans believe in fostering their progress, not suppressing it. Defeat would mean a chaotic state that becomes a haven for terrorists. That's why it's essential that the job be done right.

Unfortunately, many now seem more concerned that the job be done fast. Some of the pressure for an early U.S. exit comes from abroad: The Iraqi Governing Council has called upon the United States to cede authority directly to it, rather than wait for the creation of a constitution and elected government—a request France has seconded. But the more important pressure for a U.S. withdrawal is domestic. Looking at the electoral calendar, Bush advisers must recognize that every month American troops remain in Iraq, their presence poses a greater political liability. And many Democrats, to their discredit, are doing everything possible to make sure that it does.

Democrats complain that Bush has unnecessarily burdened American troops with the task of policing Iraq—if he would only agree to a bit more international cooperation, those could be French or Indian troops walking the streets of Baghdad. "We need more troops, [but] they are going to be foreign troops, not our troops," insisted Howard Dean at a Democratic debate earlier this month. But our allies have shown no interest in sending soldiers to Iraq under virtually any conditions. This should be clear to anybody who heard Jacques Chirac outline the French position earlier this week: Train Iraqi soldiers to take over the country's security, and hand it over to them within six to nine months. Nor have other countries leaped forward to volunteer troops. (It's not hard to see why: The U.S. experience in occupied Iraq is not exactly an enticement for others to join.) And so imploring President Bush to replace American troops with foreign ones is, in reality, a dodge. Its practical effect is to put more pressure on Bush to bring the boys home before the job is completed. That's why, after calling for more foreign troops, Dean concluded, "Our [troops] need to come home."



Democratic presidential ambitions aren't the only force pushing for early withdrawal. The constant drumbeat of deaths and the financial cost of occupation have made the war's aftermath genuinely unpopular. Republicans have demanded that Iraq pay for its own reconstruction with oil revenue or at least pay back the United States later on. Members of Congress in both parties are demanding to know how Bush can propose rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure while restraining infrastructure spending here. "It's hard to tell people there isn't money for sewers and water and then send that kind of money to Iraq," complained GOP Senator George Voinovich (who was last seen in May capitulating to yet another enormous tax cut that will crowd out domestic spending). Perhaps Bush should support more domestic infrastructure spending. But the United States, unlike Iraq, is not in shambles. And, even if it were, failure to upgrade America's roads and sewers imminently will not lead to the establishment of a despotic, anti-Western, pro-terrorist regime.

The threat now is that Republican intransigence and Democratic opportunism will pressure Bush to declare premature victory in Iraq. To some extent, Bush has brought this on himself. First, he failed to level about the costs of occupying Iraq, even silencing members of his administration, such as Lawrence Lindsey, who had the audacity to blurt out the truth. For months, he encouraged what outside experts knew was a vain hope that the Iraqi operation would pay for itself through oil revenue. His continued insistence upon tax cuts has undermined his moral leverage to demand sacrifice. And, of all the ways to pay for the $87 billion cost of occupying and rebuilding Iraq—rescinding part of the tax cut, cutting other spending, or adding to the deficit—Bush is insisting upon the last, which is also the least popular in opinion polls.

However, the fact remains that Bush is finally taking a political risk to achieve victory in a conflict whose outcome will reverberate throughout the world for years to come. It should come as no surprise that France is failing to rise to the historical occasion. Unfortunately, Congress is doing the same. ■

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NOTEBOOK

SAFIRE SMELLS A CONSPIRACY . . . ASHCROFT DILUTES A DETERRENT

PUNDITGATE

NO MAJOR AMERICAN NEWSPAPER columnist enjoys spinning a juicy tale of political intrigue more than *The New York Times'* William Safire. Safire got his start as a speechwriter in the Nixon White House and ever since has tried to show the world that all politicians are just as conspiratorial as his old boss, Tricky Dick. Safire's latest theory, proposed this week on NBC's "Meet The Press" and elaborated on in his column, is that the "Clinton-Gore mafia" have flocked to work for Wesley Clark's presidential campaign because the general is a "stalking horse" for Hillary Clinton's secret White House aspirations. How will this scenario play out? "If Bush stumbles and the Democratic nomination becomes highly valuable, the Clintons probably think they would be able to get Clark to step aside without splintering the party, rewarding his loyalty with second place on the ticket." As Safire himself might exclaim, how delicious!

Delicious, that is, until one gives his scenario a moment's thought. For starters, why would Clark play the role of Clinton toady and step aside so easily? Everyone has described Clark as remarkably ambitious, with an ego too large to abide such manipulation—especially from the former president, who stood by when Defense Secretary William Cohen fired him. What's more, according to the latest polling data from *Newsweek*, Hillary Clinton is so popular among Democrats that she could enter the race at any moment as the front-runner without a stalking horse leading the way. Besides, if she wanted a stalking horse, she probably wouldn't pick Clark. There's no evidence, after all, that his defense savvy and outsider's appeal would transfer to her—an insider without any national security bona fides. Safire's theory is so riddled with logical holes that he felt obligated to provide a backup conspiracy, suggesting in the same "Meet the Press" appearance that Clark will be a sacrificial lamb whose loss will provide "a clear field for Hillary Clinton to run in 2008." Looks like Safire's stalking horse is nothing more than a hobbyhorse.



William Safire

SHAKY FOUNDATION

GEORGE W. BUSH SHOULD BE GLAD his speech at the United Nations this week drew only polite applause. Anything louder might have brought down the house—literally. Only 50 years old, the U.N. headquarters is in drastic need of repair: Asbestos sits in the walls, there is no sprinkler system, and pieces of ceiling regularly fall on office desks. Conditions are so bad in Turtle Bay that last year one undersecretary warned of "the life-threatening conditions of work to which delegates and staff are increasingly exposed." And yet, if the roof had caved in, Bush himself would have been partly to blame. The secretary-general has repeatedly requested a $1.3 billion, no-interest loan from the United States to cover the costs of refurbishment, but the administration has so far demurred. This despite a tradition of host countries covering maintenance of U.N. facilities that dates back to the late '40s, when the United States paid for the headquarters' construction. Bush's reluctance isn't hard to fathom—Congress is hardly in a giving mood vis-à-vis the United Nations, the cost to the United States would be $700 million, and the White House is already squeezing all the dollars it can out of Capitol Hill to pay for Iraq. But, if the Bush administration expects outsized influence at the United Nations (and it does), its support for the institution will have to be similarly grand. If not, Bush shouldn't expect another round of applause anytime soon.

WEAK SIGNAL

FOR THE LAST WEEK, JOHN ASHCROFT has been stumping the country to defend his magnum opus, the Patriot Act. The events have had the feel of campaign rallies, and his speeches have displayed a feistiness rarely seen in an attorney general. Last week in Memphis, he took aim at the complaint that the act permits the government to pore through library and bookstore records. To support his case, he released an FBI memo showing that law enforcement hasn't once taken advantage of this provision. "The charges of the hysterics are revealed for what they are: castles in the air built on misrepresentation," he bellowed. "The fact is, with just eleven thousand FBI agents and over a billion visitors to America's libraries each year, the Department of Justice has neither the staffing, the time, nor the inclination to monitor the reading habits of Americans." Of course, this begs the question, if the law is so useless, why even have it on the books? Well, according to Justice Department spokesman Mark Corallo, who appeared on National Public Radio (NPR) this week, "We don't want the terrorists to think that they can go to the libraries; we do want the terrorists to

DAVID COWLES

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think we're there." Let's hope the terrorists don't listen to NPR.

WE REPORT, YOU DECIDE

"THE BEST WAY TO GET THE NEWS is from objective sources. And the most objective sources I have are people on my staff who tell me what's happening in the world."—President George W. Bush on Fox News, September 22

LET THE GOOD TIMES ROLL

IT IS WITH GREAT PLEASURE THAT WE announce the beginning of a beautiful friendship: This week, we add David Hajdu to our masthead as a regular music critic for THE NEW REPUBLIC. In his acclaimed books (*Lush Life: A Biography of Billy Strayhorn* and *Positively Fourth Street: The Lives and Times of Joan Baez, Bob Dylan, Mimi Baez Fariña and Richard Fariña*, both published by Farrar, Straus and Giroux) and in his lively and learned writings in many newspapers and journals (including the one you're holding), Hajdu has emerged as the preeminent writer on American vernacular (and sometimes not so vernacular) music in all its forms and riches. His work is extraordinary for the authority with which it combines strictly musical analysis with an understanding of larger cultural and historical questions. His first column, about Elvis Costello and the aging of rock and roll, appears on page 25.

HOME NEWS

WE ARE ALSO DELIGHTED TO announce that Elizabeth Rubin, who reported for TNR from northern Iraq during the war, has won Columbia University's second annual Kurt Schork Award for a freelance journalist covering international news. Citing her work in this magazine and elsewhere, the jurors noted "the courage and depth of her reporting in some of the world's most dangerous and misunderstood regions." We could not have put it better ourselves. ■



DON'T BACK DOWN

Candidate: John Kerry
Category: Political Courage
Grade: C

This week, John Kerry laid out his economic platform to the Detroit Economic Club, and it was good: tax breaks to keep jobs onshore, worker training, R & D investment, and tougher trade negotiations to ensure that our partners are meeting their labor and environmental obligations. And—surprise, surprise—Kerry took a shot at Howard Dean, who supports pulling out of trade deals if our partners aren't up to our labor and environmental standards. Dean's plan, Kerry argued, "would send our economy into a tailspin."

It took courage for Kerry to come to Michigan, which has lost 18 percent of its manufacturing jobs since January 2001, and reaffirm his commitment to free trade, saying that "the global economy is here, and it's here to stay." What Kerry didn't do is clear up previous statements that run almost exactly counter to his current position—namely, his declaration at August's AFL-CIO convo in Chicago that, "if it were before me today, I would vote against" CAFTA, a NAFTA counterpart for Central America. Kerry might respond that voting against CAFTA wouldn't be inconsistent with his platform because the agreement is too soft on the environment and trade. But the flexibility of his trade rhetoric is nonetheless disturbing: In Michigan, he sounded like Clinton; in Chicago, like Dean. So, while Kerry's economic platform is worth commending, let's hope he sticks with it.

—Clay Risen

THE TIES THAT BIND

Candidate: Joe Lieberman
Category: Foreign Policy
Grade: C

According to the *New Haven Register*, Joe Lieberman has released a report listing more than 30 policy recommendations for assisting the troubled U.S. manufacturing sector. Some—such as new Defense Department manufacturing programs and tax credits for manufacturing—make sense: They provide assistance to the manufacturing sector without leading to the kind of protectionist measures that have been advocated by other candidates.

But another of Lieberman's recommendations makes less sense. The *Register* reports that the senator "urged passage of legislation he introduced this year aimed at pressuring China to de-link its currency, the yuan, from the dollar, and allow it to float in the market." Unfortunately, most leading economists believe that China should not be pushed to revalue its currency any time soon, as such a move could lead to serious problems in China's weak banks, possibly threatening Chinese economic growth and, by extension, U.S. investment in China, where American businesses have billions of dollars' worth of projects. And that would wind up hurting the very workers Lieberman is trying to help.

—Joshua Kurlantzick

ENGAGING

Candidate: Wesley Clark
Category: Foreign Policy
Grade: B

Since Wesley Clark has endured a (deserved) media hazing for his apparent waffling on the Iraq war, it's worth focusing for a moment on an overlooked aspect of the retired four-star general's foreign policy. In his interview with *Newsweek*'s Evan Thomas, Clark identified what should be the central focus of the war on terrorism: Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. "You have to persuade [Pakistan President Pervez] Musharraf to shut down the religious schools," he told Thomas, "and get the Saudis to secularize." President Bush has argued that Iraq is the central theater of the war on terrorism, but, while getting Iraq right is crucial, it is no such thing.

Pakistan is a nuclear power where a U.S.-supported strongman clings to power against a rising tide of Islamic radicalism. Its security services have ties to Al Qaeda, and Osama bin Laden appears to operate freely in areas beyond government control. Meanwhile, an official who read the censored portions of the congressional September 11, 2001, investigation told me that elements within the Saudi Arabian government materially supported Al Qaeda: "We're talking about a coordinated network that reaches right from the hijackers to multiple places in the Saudi government." And, of course, Saudi Arabia evangelizes a virulent form of Islam that is completely incommensurate with Western liberalism.

When pressed by Thomas about how he would deal with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, Clark simply replied, "You've got to work the issues." Not exactly a satisfying answer. But at least he has put his finger squarely on where the issues need to be worked.

—Spencer Ackerman

For primary items updated daily and complete candidate rankings, visit *www.tnr.com/primary*.

CARICATURES BY ZACH TRENHOLM

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On the Hill

Memory Loss

BY MICHAEL CROWLEY

DICK GEPHARDT IS one angry man these days. In recent campaign appearances, he has been working himself into red-faced, podium-pounding rages about the "failures" of the Bush administration, especially overseas. "This president is a miserable failure on foreign policy," Gephardt declared at the Democratic debate in Albuquerque on September 4. "He has failed the American people." After such outbursts, rivals are quick to note that Gephardt was, in fact, an enthusiastic supporter of Bush's go-it-alone war in Iraq. But, lately, Gephardt has developed a retort: that he saw the current trouble coming and urged Bush to take a more multilateral approach. "From the start, I've told this president that we could win the war alone, but we won't be able to win the peace alone," Gephardt said in a September 7 press release. He made the point again in a Baltimore debate later that week: "I told this president a year and a half ago that, if he wanted to deal with Iraq, he had to get the U.N., he had to get NATO to help us, that we needed their money and their personnel."

It may be literally true that Gephardt offered Bush this prescient counsel. But the former House minority leader's words matter far less than his deeds—specifically, his decision to embrace the president's war resolution just as support was building for an alternative that put a greater emphasis on international backing and postwar planning. In other words, his current protestations notwithstanding, when it comes to the centerpiece of Bush's "miserable" foreign policy, Gephardt was himself one of the president's primary enablers.

To understand Gephardt's precise role in the march to war, flash back twelve months. On September 19, 2002, Bush presented Congress with a resolution declaring, "The president is authorized to use all means that he determines to be appropriate, including force" to enforce U.N. resolutions and defend the United States against the threat posed by Iraq. It said nothing about support from the United Nations, NATO, or other allies, or about postwar rebuilding plans. Most Democrats and even some moderate Republicans found it too broad, and the White House agreed to negotiate its language with congressional leaders. For the next two weeks, Gephardt—along with House Speaker Dennis Hastert and Senate leaders Tom Daschle and Trent Lott—met regularly with the president and national security council officials. Gephardt aides say it was during these meetings and in private one-on-one telephone conversations that Gephardt implored Bush to seek broad international support.

Other Democrats recommended the same thing. But they were determined to put it into legally binding language. Daschle, for instance, encouraged a bipartisan effort by Senators Joe Biden and Richard Lugar to promote an alternative resolution. The Biden-Lugar bill, as it was known, was crafted to win over moderates of both parties and, perhaps more importantly, to placate U.S. allies. Biden-Lugar defined the grounds for war more narrowly than the White House's resolution, stating that a war's purpose would be only to disarm Saddam Hussein of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and not to enforce "all relevant" U.N. resolutions—such as the return of Kuwaiti property seized in 1991, a provision some U.S. allies found absurd. Biden-Lugar also required Bush to report back to Congress on his U.N. diplomacy before launching a war and granted him authority to attack in the face of U.N. opposition only if he made the case that Iraq's WMD presented a "grave threat" to the United States. And it mandated that Bush send Congress a report within 30 days of the commencement of war, further detailing "the degree to which other nations will assist the U.S. in using force against Iraq," and his planning for postwar reconstruction—complete with cost estimates. All in all, just the sort of thing Gephardt says he wanted.

Biden and Lugar unveiled their proposal on Friday, September 27. Senate moderates, including Republicans, such as Chuck Hagel, Arlen Specter, and Lincoln Chafee, expressed interest, and Biden suggested the resolution might draw 60 to 70 votes. Bush quickly rejected the plan, publicly complaining that it would "tie my hands." In negotiations with congressional leaders, Bush aides pressed for fast action on their original resolution. But the multilateralists nonetheless felt they were gaining momentum.

Then, on October 2, just five days after Biden and Lugar offered their plan, Gephardt pulled the rug out from under them, notifying Daschle that he'd found common ground with the White House. Within hours, CNN was carrying live footage of Gephardt standing next to Bush at a Rose Garden ceremony where the president boasted of a "bipartisan resolution." The implications were instantly clear: Gephardt "gave the White House some cherished high-level Democratic support," *The New York Times* reported, and another step toward "unstoppable momentum," as *The Washington Post* put it. According to Democratic sources, Daschle aides were "just livid" and "felt betrayed," realizing their hopes for an alternative resolution were doomed. Biden and Lugar quickly canceled a Foreign Relations Committee hearing on their measure. "I'm a realist," Biden told the *Times*, which noted that "the day's developments would peel away Republican support for his measure and make him unlikely to succeed." Lugar spokesman Andy Fisher concurs: Gephardt's deal "really ended the whole Biden-Lugar idea," he says. (Gephardt aides say that, at the time, Lugar had begun to retreat from his plan under White House pressure. But Fisher denies this, and news accounts from the time support him.)

Gephardt's move also shattered the prospects of two

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even more restrictive proposals that would later emerge—one sponsored by Carl Levin in the Senate and another by John Spratt in the House—that would have required Bush to first seek a U.N. resolution authorizing war and then return to Congress for another vote if he failed. "Gephardt is trying to portray himself as essentially being John Kerry, as someone who had real doubts about the way Bush was going about doing this," says a Democratic foreign policy aide. "If Gephardt were honest about saying, 'Mr. President, you must go through the U.N.,' he wouldn't have done that."

Gephardt's aides respond that the White House was always prepared to ram its original "blank-check" resolution through the GOP-controlled House. Senate moderates, hoping that large numbers of Republicans would buck the president, "were living in a fantasy land," says Gephardt Chief of Staff Steve Elmendorf. Gephardt's deal was the best compromise possible. But it was barely a compromise at all. The resolution still included the broad language about "all relevant" U.N. resolutions that irritated many allies. Its only real nod to multinational support was a clause decreeing that Congress "supports the efforts by the president to ... obtain prompt and decisive action by the Security Council." Whereas Biden-Lugar required the president to explain to Congress a failure of U.N. diplomacy before launching a war, Gephardt's compromise allowed him to do so 48 hours *after* the fighting began. The resolution included only the most laughably vague reference to postwar reconstruction and costs, calling for a bimonthly report to Congress on the "status of planning for efforts that are expected to be required after such [military] actions are completed." Finally, another provision cited by Gephardt actually may have made the resolution *worse* than Bush's original: After first pressing for language that promised an invasion of Iraq would not interfere with the larger war on terrorism, Gephardt settled for a clause assuring that the war was "consistent" with the war on terrorism—a phrase that played right into the administration's rhetorical strategy (and one that practically invited the subsequent diversion of Special Forces from the hunt for Osama bin Laden to the hunt for Saddam).

All of which today leaves Gephardt defending two irreconcilable claims. On the one hand, he casts himself as an important moderating influence on the president's Iraq policy. On the other, he complains that Bush completely ignored his suggestions. Either way, he is saddled with a pro-war vote that may be his biggest obstacle to winning the Democratic nomination. No wonder he's so mad. ■

Clark was not Clinton's general.

Falsely Accused

BY SPENCER ACKERMAN

THERE MAY BE no worse epithet in military circles than "Clinton's general." So it came as little surprise that, as soon as retired General Wesley Clark threw his stars into the race for the Democratic presidential nomination—and hired a Clintonite all-star team to staff his campaign—conservatives rushed to tarnish him by association with their most loathed president. Oklahoma Senator James Inhofe reminded *The Wall Street Journal*'s John Fund that the former supreme allied commander "was known as 'Clinton's general' " for the way he "constantly ran decisions about the Kosovo war directly by the White House." By way of elaboration, *National Review*'s David Frum called Clark the embodiment of all the "illusions and errors of the 1990s," arguing that his NATO leadership was "based on an unending series of errors, above all his claim that his air campaigns could destroy Serbian military capabilities." In a column this week, Robert Novak implied that Clark would not have been promoted without the intervention of senior Clinton officials.

The onslaught is bewildering for two reasons. First, none of it is true: It was the White House that demanded the tactical-level briefings during the Kosovo campaign; Clark (along with über-hawk John McCain) was a relentless proponent of using ground troops against Slobodan Milosevic; and Clark's mid-'90s promotions were at the behest of Joint Chiefs Chairman John Shalikashvili. In fact, when the Pentagon rewarded Clark for winning the Kosovo war by callously dismissing him, many conservatives were justifiably outraged. In 1999, Thomas Donnelly of the American Enterprise Institute described Clark in the same breath as several of history's most legendary warriors, writing that "he has suffered a similar fate to that of Epaminondas, Sherman, and Patton—cast aside by his political masters."

More important, portraying Clark's military career as Clintonian entirely ignores the heated defense policy battles of the '90s. As this week's *Newsweek* cover profile makes clear, Clark often clashed with his uniformed and civilian superiors when their strategic judgment conflicted with his. But it was Clark's bureaucratic adversaries—in particular, Secretary of Defense William Cohen; Shalikashvili's successor, Hugh Shelton; and most of the armed service chiefs—who better resembled the president they served. Like President Clinton, they were risk-averse, half-heartedly committed to the mission, and reluctant to make important decisions. Clark, by contrast, refused time and again to shrink from the Balkan slaughter, to wage a traditional military campaign, or to promise an antiseptic war. In fact, Clark's foreign policy instincts could hardly be more un-Clintonian.

Unlike most officers who served in Vietnam, Clark came home from the jungles convinced of the importance of defending U.S. values with force. As he writes in his memoir,

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Waging Modern War, "One of life's greatest gifts, I've found, is the opportunity to fight for what's right." He adds, "There is so much more to be done." Throughout the '90s, he bridled at U.S. inaction, particularly in Rwanda, where rampaging Hutu militiamen murdered 800,000 Tutsi in 100 days. The response from Washington was worse than nothing: Secretary of State Warren Christopher urged a "full, orderly withdrawal" of U.N. peacekeepers, lest the United States be called upon to relieve the rump force, a prospect the Pentagon adamantly opposed. Clark, then Shalikashvili's policy director, was ashamed. He later observed to author Samantha Power, "The Pentagon is always going to be the last to want to intervene." In *Waging Modern War*, Clark implies that the military dishonored itself "when we stood by as nearly a million Africans were hacked to death."

A year later, Clark risked his career to confront the uniformed reluctance to use force in defense of human rights. As Shalikashvili's envoy in the Balkans, he directly crossed Admiral Leighton Smith, the four-star commander of Mediterranean NATO forces. NATO began bombing Bosnian Serb positions in late August 1995 in order to force an end to a genocidal campaign controlled by Serbian dictator Milosevic. Although NATO demanded a full Serb withdrawal from the besieged city of Sarajevo, Smith urged that a brief bombing pause in early September be extended indefinitely, since, as he explained to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, he thought the United States had no business intervening. But Clark, then still a three-star, insisted in a heated telephone call that the bombing should continue as planned. As Holbrooke writes in *To End A War*, "I could tell from the noises emanating from Clark's cell phone that he was being scolded by a very angry, very senior American naval commander." Smith—who quickly alerted his superiors to Clark's insolence—had the inclinations of NATO policymakers on his side; after all, heads of state had neglected Bosnia as long as was politically tolerable. But Clark was right, and he won: The bombing resumed and caused the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw from Sarajevo within two weeks of Clark's clash with Smith. That November, the warring parties met at Dayton to negotiate a peace accord. Shalikashvili soon afterward awarded Clark his fourth star—despite ferocious resistance from the Army, which would have preferred his retirement.

But it was as NATO commander that Clark took his biggest gamble—against practically the entire Pentagon—and triumphed. By early 1999, Milosevic's army was murdering Albanian civilians in the Serbian province of Kosovo, despite a U.N. Security Council resolution and NATO threats to bomb. Negotiations at Rambouillet, France, had failed. With NATO's credibility on the line and Kosovar lives in jeopardy, Clark prepared to transform diplomacy backed by the threat of force into diplomacy backed by its use. But Clark's plans were vastly different from those favored by his Pentagon colleagues, who advocated the Powell Doctrine's dictate of overwhelming force in pursuit of a specific goal. Instead, Clark merged military and diplomatic action into a hybrid—as the bombing intensified, so did NATO's demands, moving from a return to negotiations to halting the ensuing ethnic cleansing to a final settlement of Kosovo's political status. It was an incremental war with incremental objectives, brazenly flouting the Powell Doctrine.

Clark's Pentagon superiors were appalled. During both the buildup and the campaign itself, the military—and, subsequently, the White House—hobbled the NATO commander. In December 1998, Clark requested that the U.S. Army prepare for an impending war. Chief of Staff Dennis Reimer, who had fought nearly all of Clark's high-profile promotions, bluntly responded, "But we don't want to fight there." The next month, the service chiefs met and decided to undercut the war effort by emphasizing the possibility of bloody conflict—a prospect they knew would frighten Clinton. As a senior military official explained to *The Washington Post*, "I don't think anybody felt like there had been a compelling argument made that all of this was in our national interest." Although the chiefs argued that sanctions alone might bring Milosevic to heel, they would not even credibly *threaten* the use of force needed for their success: In March, on the eve of the war, the Pentagon ordered the U.S.S. *Theodore Roosevelt* out of the Adriatic, sending a message of vacillation during Clark's preparations.

But, if the Pentagon acted to stall the campaign, at least its position on the war was clear. The same could not be said of the Clinton White House. In March, NATO opened its offensive against Milosevic. But the night the bombing began, Clinton issued a critical statement: "I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war." This position reflected the advice of Defense Secretary Cohen and Joint Chiefs Chairman Shelton, but it confounded Clark. The war was predicated on NATO's ability to gradually increase the pressure on Milosevic, but, without at least the plausible threat of an invasion, NATO leverage was crippled. Clark confided to British Prime Minister Tony Blair, "I can't guarantee [victory] with air power alone." Behind the scenes, he began to lobby for a 175,000-troop invasion of Kosovo, and, as the bombing dragged on through April, the White House realized that ruling out ground troops had hamstrung the campaign. Yet Clark could not even get the White House to decide *when to decide* if an invasion would go forward. In mid-May, national security adviser Sandy Berger asked him, "How long can we defer a decision, Wes?" When Clark responded that operational planning had to begin on June 1, Berger asked, "Can you push that date back a couple of weeks, to, let's say, 15 June?" By that time—thanks to intensified bombing, increased NATO and Russian diplomacy, and word of a prospective invasion—Milosevic had capitulated.

BUT NOT EVEN victory stopped the Clinton administration's intransigence. After Milosevic began to withdraw from Kosovo in early June, Russian troops began moving from their Bosnian positions toward the strategically important Pristina airfield. Clark worried that the Russians would occupy a portion of

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UPDATE

SAUDI ARABIA: WAR ON TERRORISM

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Many of the world's nations have long relied on internal agencies and controls to guard against terrorist infiltration and to thwart potential attacks. Now, however, governments around the world are being asked to acknowledge their responsibility to the global community by sharing information and intelligence on would-be threats.

International cooperation is essential to successfully defeat terrorism. Saudi Arabia supported many international efforts through multilateral and bilateral agreements long before the war on terrorism reached American soil. In 1996, for example, Saudi Arabia established a joint Counter-Terrorism Committee with the United States. This task force, comprised of intelligence and law enforcement personnel, was formed to share information on Al-Qaeda.

Since September 11, our two nations have stepped up cooperation by meeting regularly to exchange information and resources, as well as develop action plans to root out terrorist networks. We clearly recognize the need to publicly report our progress as we assess the effectiveness of our initiatives:

- In August 2003, a new U.S.-Saudi task force was formed to concentrate on terror financing.

- In May 2003, a U.S.-Saudi task force was organized from across law enforcement and intelligence agencies to share "real time" intelligence. This enables us to work side by side in joint operations to combat imminent threats.

- Also in May 2003, Saudi authorities worked closely with U.S. and British law enforcement agents who came to the Kingdom to assist in the investigation of the Riyadh attacks.

- Saudi Arabia has provided extensive intelligence and military cooperation in the assault on Al-Qaeda. Public disclosures to date have revealed major Saudi contributions to the breakup of a number of Al-Qaeda cells, the arrests of key Al-Qaeda commanders, and the capture of numerous Al-Qaeda members.

- Saudi Arabia is actively engaging other countries to locate and extradite Al-Qaeda operatives who may be hiding in those countries.

We remain committed to working closely with the United States and other allies in the world community to ensure that information is effectively shared between all nations dedicated to ending the scourge of terrorism.

"The target of the Al-Qaeda terrorists is Saudi Arabia and the United States and the 70-year relationship that has benefited both our peoples; and at a time when we are working together to bring peace and stability to the people of the Middle East, their aim is to destroy our alliance through violence. But they will not succeed."

Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United States
May 13, 2003

"The Saudis are providing increasingly important support to our counter-terrorism efforts – from arrests to sharing debriefing results."

George Tenet, CIA Director
February 11, 2003

THE PEOPLE OF SAUDI ARABIA
Allies Against Terrorism
www.saudiembassy.net

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Kosovo independently of NATO and allow Serb atrocities to continue, as they had in Bosnia. He arranged with Washington to quickly take the airfield under the pretext of coordinating communication and information flow with the arriving Russians. But, after Moscow assured Washington that its troops would not enter Kosovo on their own, Shelton told Clark to stand down. Hours later, however, Russian soldiers began to land in Pristina in violation of their pledge. Clark felt his hand had been forced and ordered three-star British General Michael Jackson to have his troops block Pristina's runways. But Jackson thought the move might spark a firefight with the Russians and refused, famously telling the NATO commander, "Sir, I'm not starting World War III for you." Instead, Jackson suggested taking the roads near the field. Clark's command to seize the airfield has been recently cited as evidence of his overaggressiveness (hardly a Clintonian trait). But, although Jackson's quote was memorable, in essence the British general's plan differed with Clark's by only a few stretches of road. And it worked. In the end, NATO took the roads, and there was no confrontation. Of course, had the Clinton administration followed Clark's advice to take the airfields in the first place, the incident might well have been avoided altogether.

Clark's tactical and strategic wisdom went unappreciated inside the Beltway. He was rewarded for his win in Kosovo by a terse call from Shelton the following month informing him that his NATO assignment would end early. (According to *Waging Modern War*, Shelton would not even show Clark the courtesy of extending the phone call a few minutes to work out a face-saving exit.) Clinton privately told Clark, "I had nothing to do with it." Indeed, Clinton had very little to do with practically everything about Clark—including Clark's victory—while generals who shared the president's disinterest in the mission stymied a successful commander. Yet Clark has never disparaged Clinton's efforts to take full credit for winning the war—most recently, during the former president's triumphant trip to Kosovo last week. How un-Clintonian. ■

Kigali Dispatch

Quiet Riot

BY DINA TEMPLE-RASTON

THERE WAS BEDLAM in the streets of Kigali, Rwanda's capital, last month as Rwandans celebrated the first contested presidential election in their country's 40-year history. Horns blasted. Residents sang and hooted, punched the air, and guzzled banana beer. When night fell, small knots of Rwandans gathered for impromptu roadside parties in the darkness, spontaneously hugging each other and laughing. The election was won by the incumbent, President Paul Kagame, the former head of the army and a man so soft-spoken you have to lean in to hear him.

Washington celebrated as well. The White House dispatched a congratulatory note to Kagame and released a press statement lauding the Rwandans for "their commitment to democracy" and their "important step forward in the political transition and reconciliation of their nation."

But the jubilation was misplaced. Though Kagame speaks quietly, he has no qualms about loud, autocratic action. In the months before the election, his government used force and intimidation to silence his most serious critics. By polling time, Kagame had effectively quashed his opponents. Unfortunately, Washington, haunted by memories of the Rwandan genocide, has completely looked the other way.

In 1994, Kagame, head of the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front, marched into Kigali and deposed the Hutu government, which had helped slaughter large numbers of the minority Tutsi population while the world watched. That victory, and the period of relative tranquility that followed, made Kagame, who later became president, popular among both Tutsi and some Hutu. And, throughout the next decade, Kagame and his allies brought some measure of stability to the devastated country. His government set up a court system and began trying masterminds of the genocide, a move that helped avoid vigilante justice. He embarked on education reforms, worked to diversify the economy, and cracked down on crime. Everyday life began to return to normal.

But, despite these positive changes, Kagame never lost the general's need for total control. And, in the run-up to last month's election, this autocratic side appeared in force. Despite his popularity, Kagame remained concerned that, as a Tutsi, he was a minority in Rwanda, and people might vote in the presidential poll along ethnic lines. After all, his strongest potential opponent was a former prime minister, Faustin Twagiramungu, a Hutu. So Parliament, a body controlled by close allies of Kagame, banned the main opposition party, the Hutu-dominated Mouvement Populaire Republicain, or MDR, and demanded it be disbanded. Lawmakers also passed vaguely worded campaign rules that prohibited, among other things, the mere mention of ethnicity—a ban used as a pretext to arrest opposition leaders who called on the Hutu to vote along ethnic lines. In addition to the MDR ban, nearly everyone else deemed an electoral threat was intimidated in the weeks leading up to the election. An EU election-observer team found that Twagiramungu couldn't run an effective campaign because many of his staff, including twelve provincial coordi-

Dina Temple-Raston is the foreign editor of THE NEW YORK SUN. *Free Press will publish her book on Rwanda next year.*

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Parthenon, Acropolis, Athens, Greece.

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nators, were arrested. Campaign posters for Twagiramungu that managed to find their way onto walls or community bulletin boards were quickly torn down.

Kagame's party, by contrast, campaigned with almost manic energy. My friend's mother was pulled out of the crowd at a Kagame rally by security men because she was not punching the air during a requisite cheer. She explained that she wasn't subversive but merely arthritic and showed she had trouble raising her arms above her shoulders. The security detail admonished her to cheer louder to make up for her affliction.

Though Kagame had already created what Amnesty International called a "climate of fear" in the election's final days, he took no chances. The president's campaign persuaded Alivera Mukabaramba, a rival, to withdraw at the last minute and endorse the president. The European Union found that media coverage in the days just before the poll was heavily biased toward Kagame: 99 percent of coverage of the president was positive, while 65 percent of reporting about Twagiramungu cast him in a negative light. The EU team, which visited 372 polling stations throughout the country, also reported that Election Day was "punctuated by certain irregularities and cases of fraud." "People handing out ballot papers were, in some polling stations, indicating to the voters who to vote for," said the head of the team, Colette Flesch. "In other cases, Kagame's representatives took charge of the polling stations, intimidating both the electoral officials and the voters themselves." Unsurprisingly, Kagame "officially" won 95 percent of the vote.

But, while Amnesty International and the EU team harshly criticized Kagame, Washington took a very different line. The White House statement congratulating the Rwandan president on his win neglected to mention the widespread repression before, during, and after the election. Two weeks ago, State Department deputy spokesman Philip Reeker allowed that the United States was "concerned" about reports of voter harassment. But he made no other comment.

Rwanda watchers say Kagame skillfully plays on the memories of 1994 to keep Washington silent. "Any time anyone in the international community considers challenging Kagame, they have to prepare themselves to respond to the question he can legitimately ask, 'Where were you in 1994?' And that's kept them quiet. Kagame has been very good at playing that card," says one diplomat. Indeed, Kagame told me that, every time he sees Bill Clinton, the former president apologizes for not coming to Rwanda's aid when the genocide started. Kagame says Clinton's most recent mea culpa came only months ago, at a conference in Aspen.

Strategic considerations also drive U.S. policy. Renewed Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda could stoke further unrest in neighboring Burundi and Congo, so Kagame's ability to keep a lid on anger pleases Washington. What's more, Rwanda has been a U.S. ally in the region, taking the U.S. side in the war on terrorism and helping Washington check France's influence in Central Africa.

IN FACT, SINCE 1994, the United States has gone out if its way to give Kagame the benefit of the doubt. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited Rwanda in December 1997, during a spate of ethnic violence in the northwestern part of the country. Instead of condemning the acts, she told journalists that the violence was understandable given Rwanda's past history. The United States has poured aid into Rwanda, giving Kagame's regime $140 million since 1999. By comparison, neighboring Burundi has received next to nothing from the United States during the same period of time. This March, President Bush gave Kagame an hour of Oval Office time, a large amount for a leader of a small nation.

And, now, Washington has stood aside as Rwanda's first supposedly democratic election descended into farce—a tragedy, given that Rwanda could have been a model for the continent. If ever there were an African candidate who could make a legitimate run for the highest office in the land, Kagame appeared to be it. He enjoyed widespread popularity in Rwanda due to his success in restoring stability since 1994 and likely would have won the election even if he hadn't pushed his opponents aside and rigged the polls. Instead, an African leader who could have set an example of a military man transforming himself into a legitimate democrat has become yet one more example of a type of leader Africa doesn't lack: dictator. ■

The IAEA enables Iran.
Enabler

BY MICHAEL LEVI

TWO WEEKS AGO in Vienna, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) gave Iran until October 31 to prove it does not possess a hidden nuclear weapons program. The agency's board demanded Iran answer a host of outstanding questions about its nuclear activities and quickly comply with requests for expanded inspections. The board's action was widely lauded as surprisingly strong—most had expected it to issue only a weak statement, and few had thought a deadline would be imposed.

But, while the IAEA ultimatum was a tactical victory, it may be setting the stage for a strategic disaster. The IAEA's chief goal is a more transparent Iranian nuclear program: If Iran accounts for all its nuclear materials by October 31 and agrees to give the IAEA expanded inspection authority, the agency's board is unlikely to cite Iran for breaching the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—despite overwhelming evidence of violations. Unfortunately, transparency is not enough to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear

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

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

Daniel Pipes, director of the Middle East Forum, bestselling author, and prize-winning columnist for the *New York Post* and *Jerusalem Post* has been a former official in the Departments of State and Defense, and has taught at the University of Chicago, Harvard University, and the U.S. Naval War College. He has been nominated by President Bush to serve on the Board of Directors of the U.S. Institute of Peace.

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bomb. A clean bill of health from the IAEA would leave Iran's entire nuclear effort intact, and, although the agency would closely monitor the country for signs of a weapons program, the most difficult step in building a nuclear arsenal—making enough plutonium or highly enriched uranium—can be taken under the guise of a legal, "peaceful" energy program. If it plays its cards right, Iran, with the IAEA as unwitting enabler, could thus pursue a nuclear weapons program with little interference, simply ejecting IAEA inspectors and perhaps withdrawing from the NPT before actually building any weapons—a process that could take only a matter of weeks once it has enough fissile material.

Ever since Iran renewed active pursuit of nuclear power in 1995, the United States has been rightly suspicious that the effort was intended primarily as cover for an illicit nuclear weapons program. But the U.S. case was entirely circumstantial and largely inferential; until recent months, there was no proof of Iran's deceit around which the United States could build an international consensus for action. In the summer of 2002, though, a dissident group called the National Council of Resistance of Iran revealed that Tehran was pursuing a secret nuclear development program—specifically, that it was building a heavy-water production plant in Arak and a uranium-enrichment facility in Natanz. Since then, officials from the IAEA have engaged in a painstaking process of inspections and analysis, attempting to uncover the true nature and extent of the Iranian effort. Iranian officials have been disturbingly uncooperative. Inspectors have been denied access to essential sites, only to be granted entry after those facilities had been thoroughly cleaned of potentially incriminating evidence. And Iran has met IAEA questioning with a series of contradictory explanations.

In late August, those contradictions were catalogued in an IAEA report providing overwhelming evidence that Iran has lied about its nuclear program and broken its NPT obligations. Yet, when the IAEA board met two weeks ago in Vienna, it did not accuse Tehran of illegal activity—it simply issued the October 31 deadline. Had the IAEA declared Iran in noncompliance with its treaty obligations, it would have forced the U.N. Security Council to take up the Iranian case, improving U.S. leverage and increasing pressure on Tehran to give up its most threatening nuclear technologies. Instead, the IAEA essentially affirmed that, if Iran agrees to develop its supposed power program openly, it will whitewash Tehran's past violations, allowing that country's ruling mullahs to continue to accumulate the materials and technology they need to build nuclear weapons. If the IAEA fails to take advantage of the current opportunity to bring Iran's violations to the Security Council, the very organization responsible for monitoring the NPT will have provided cover to a state seeking a nuclear arsenal.

At the last IAEA board meeting in June, delegates were presented with evidence that Iran had secretly imported 1,800 kilograms of uranium from China—uranium it had been required, under the NPT, to declare; they were told of a well-developed uranium-enrichment program, which suggested that Iran had previously tested centrifuges with uranium, in clear contravention of its NPT obligations; and they learned of Iranian plans to build a plutonium-production reactor based on heavy-water technology, which could provide material for nuclear weapons. But Iran offered explanations for all these findings: Officials claimed they'd been unaware of their obligation to report the uranium imports; insisted they had used inert gas, not uranium, to test their centrifuges; and said they planned to use their plutonium-production reactor to produce medical materials, such as radioisotopes used to diagnose cancer. These arguments, while not entirely convincing, were plausible enough to deflect international concern.

Since the June meeting, however, the IAEA has uncovered abundant evidence that the Iranian explanations are, in fact, false. A report delivered in late August by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei to the IAEA board asserts that "some of the information [provided by Iran] was in contrast to that previously provided by Iran." Translation: Either Iran was lying before, or it's lying now—or both. That conclusion lends significant weight to U.S. suspicions of a clandestine nuclear weapons program and makes it essential that the international community act before Iran proceeds further.

There are several key inconsistencies in Iran's explanations of its nuclear activity. In June, the IAEA reported Iran's explicit denial that it had used its covertly imported uranium to perform "conversion experiments," which change the chemical or physical form of uranium and are an essential component of an enrichment program. According to the new report, however, Iran has now admitted to conducting precisely those types of experiments. The report also notes that Iran has thus far been unable to satisfactorily explain the disappearance of 1.9 kilograms of its imported uranium, which many suspect has been used in enrichment experiments. Initially, Iran simply claimed the uranium had leaked through a defective valve, but IAEA tests called that explanation into question. Now, to maintain the story's technical credibility, Iran has claimed that the uranium was stored in a room where temperatures exceeded 130 degrees Fahrenheit, roughly the temperature at which uranium hexafluoride—the form in which the uranium was stored—becomes a gas and can leak. That story strains credulity given that outdoor temperatures in Iran don't reach 130 degrees and, while indoor temperatures theoretically could, Iran has offered no explanation for why it would store such precious material so carelessly.

The IAEA also rejects Iran's explanations of how it tested its centrifuges without using uranium—and with good reason. Originally, Iran claimed to have used inert gas in testing but now says it did not test the centrifuges at all and instead relied on computer simulations and technical data from drawings purchased abroad. But Iran has failed to produce original copies of the drawings. And, regardless, according

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to the IAEA, "It is not possible to develop enrichment technology, to the level seen at Natanz, based solely on open-source information and computer simulations, without process testing with [uranium]." While the IAEA is not explicit, the implication is clear: Iran has tested its centrifuges using uranium—a clear violation of the NPT—and is now trying to cover it up.

Investigation of Iran's plans for a plutonium-production reactor has revealed inconsistencies, too. To use the reactor to make medical materials—Iran's stated intent—Iran would need to build "hot cells," lead-lined devices where used reactor fuel could be manipulated to extract the medically useful materials. This past summer, at the IAEA's request, Iran submitted design plans for its plutonium-production reactor, but they included no references to hot cells. As the IAEA notes, this is "contrary to what would be expected given the radioisotope production purposes of the facility," implying that Iran has fudged its documents. Why would it do that? Perhaps because hot cells can also be used to extract plutonium for nuclear weapons, and Iran thought that, by leaving hot cells out of its designs, it could avoid suspicions about its work. According to the IAEA, "Iran has been asked to look into this matter further," a polite way of suggesting that Iran tell the truth.

Despite the implications of last week's resolution, it is too late for Iran to put this matter to rest with further explanations. It has already had that opportunity—and has instead lied. In November, the IAEA board should cite Iran for its past noncompliance with the NPT, automatically sending the matter to the Security Council—regardless of what Iran does before the October 31 deadline. The IAEA appears hesitant to do that, probably because it would eliminate the agency's chance to expand its inspection powers in Iran. But, while inspections may be useful, they are not an end in themselves. They are a tool to monitor compliance and ferret out wrongdoing—which is exactly what they have done.

Now it is time for the IAEA to turn the question of how to deal with an NPT violator over to the Security Council. Options would range from demanding Iran terminate parts of its nuclear program (uranium enrichment would be a good place to start) to imposing economic sanctions or even eventually to authorizing military action to destroy the Natanz enrichment plant. But, if instead the IAEA declines to cite Iran's violations, it will give political cover to those, such as Russia or China, who may be inclined to deny that a serious problem exists. Without international action to contain it, Iran's nuclear program will proceed apace, spurring an atomic race in the region, fracturing nonproliferation firewalls, and increasing the prospect that nuclear weapons could fall into terrorists' hands. If the IAEA gives Iran a clean bill of health in November and any of these eventualities comes to pass, the agency will have much to answer for. ■

Billy Tauzin, charming villain.

Cajun Dressing

BY MICHELLE COTTLE

BOUDREAUX AND THIBODEAUX were out in the woods hunting one day. The pair stayed out so late that it got dark, and they got lost on the bayou. Standing at the edge of the water, Boudreaux looked at Thibodeaux and asked, "So how we gonna get across? It's cold, and it's deep, and we got all these hunting clothes on." About that time, a fellow from Texas A&M showed up across the way, and Boudreaux yelled over to him, "Do you know where we can cross?" "No," said the fellow, "but I got this here flashlight with me. I can shine it across the water and make an artificial bridge for you to walk across." Boudreaux yelled back, "You must think we're stupid!" "Why?" asked the Aggie. "Because," said Boudreaux, "we gonna get halfway across, and you gonna cut that light off!"

In his two decades on Capitol Hill, Representative Billy Tauzin has become famous for his "Boudreaux stories": tall tales—most of them corny, many of them racy—about a fictional clan of ne'er-do-wells from the Cajun stretch of southeast Louisiana where Tauzin was born and bred. He has "zillions" of such stories, say friends, and, with minimal tweaking, can roll them out to warm up the crowds at bayou barbecues and congressional hearings alike. "He will change the language and punch line to suit the audience so that he never offends and always entertains. That's what's so cool about him," says Frank Luntz, a Republican pollster and unabashed Tauzin enthusiast. Luntz sees this ability to read a room and smoothly adjust course as the core of Tauzin's political genius. "What makes Billy Tauzin great is that he communicates with you at exactly your level, not one degree higher or one degree lower," gushes Luntz. "There is nobody in politics who is as effective at being what he needs to be at that time to get his message across. He is incredible. He is irreplaceable."

Luntz is far from alone in his admiration. With a twinkle in his eye and an ear-tickling Loo-siana lilt to his drawl, Tauzin is widely recognized as one of Congress's most compelling orators, popular showmen, and formidable retail politicians—able to charm the pants off any crowd in any situation. He is quick with a quip. (Of his home state, he has

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joked that "half of it is under water and the other half under indictment.") And, unlike so many of his colleagues, he doesn't take himself too seriously. (In a fund-raising video for the 2000 elections, Tauzin donned military attire—including a baby-blue sash and bow—to deliver a rally-the-troops speech à la George C. Scott in *Patton*.) He is among the GOP's most sought-after speakers for industry events, political rallies, and especially fund-raisers: In 2000, National Republican Congressional Committee Chairman Tom Davis declared Tauzin "the Magic Man" and ranked him the group's number-two draw after the House speaker. Tauzin's infectious joie de vivre has helped render him unbeatable with voters back home, where he consistently runs without any opposition worth mentioning. And, within the Capitol corridors, it has helped grease his ascent to one of the most powerful positions in the House: chairman of the Energy and Commerce Committee, which claims at least partial oversight of virtually every industry in the nation—from drug companies to automakers to media empires. With a (very loosely) estimated three-quarters of House legislation passing through its fingers, Energy and Commerce is, among K Street types, a force to be reckoned with—and sucked up to—under ordinary circumstances. In this era of corporate scandal, Tauzin's flair for hosting high-drama hearings on the sins of everyone from Global Crossing to Martha Stewart has raised his committee's profile with the broader public and made the flamboyant chairman a darling of the national media.

But not everyone is so enamored of the Louisianan's storied charms. To Tauzin's critics (who include much of the public interest community), his down-home manner is the colorful candy shell masking a dark core: a wily self-promoter who serves as a corporate shill for the legion of big-money donors with business before his committee—that is, until some corporate misdeed generates a politically hazardous level of public ire, as with Firestone or Enron, at which point Tauzin swiftly reverses his position, presenting himself as an outraged consumer champion in his made-for-TV hearings. The most oft-cited example of this cynical two-step is Tauzin's successful 2000 crusade to derail reform of the accounting industry—among the representative's most generous benefactors—followed by his fiery denunciation of Arthur Andersen et al during last year's Enron probe.

Particularly galling to the goo-goos is that, for the most part, Tauzin operates without serious blowback from either the press or public. He's every bit as egregious in his pursuit of corporate cash and his selling of congressional access as, say, the frequently demonized Tom DeLay. And his m.o. of raking in great wads of industry money with one hand while, with the other, wielding the gavel at oversight hearings on those same industries would likely prove a serious p.r. problem for most Republicans. But Tauzin manages to diffuse these hypocrisy charges with a reassuring grin, a pitch-perfect quote, or a bit of theater. If anything, Tauzin's very shamelessness and his Southern insouciance help inoculate him from charges of political duplicity and let him get away with a degree of sleaze that would land most of his colleagues in hot water. It's all part of some innate political gift, sigh critics, that prevents people from recognizing—or perhaps from caring—what a disgrace Tauzin really is.

"Billy Tauzin is very much in the tradition of Louisiana legislators," asserts Representative John Dingell of Michigan, who, when Democrats controlled the House, ruled the Commerce Committee with an iron hand. "If you are familiar with Louisiana members, you understand what I mean. If you don't, there is nothing I can do to amplify." For better or worse, the Pelican State is well-known for producing distinctive political characters, such as Huey Long, Russell Long, and Edwin Edwards—strong leaders (at times a bit too strong) with grand ambitions (at times a bit too grand), a common touch, and a quick wit. "Certainly, here in Louisiana, we like humor," quips the state GOP's chairwoman, Pat Brister. "You can tell that by the people we've elected." This holds particularly true downstate, where Tauzin's roots—and his congressional constituency—lie. Louisiana's Third District is largely rural and, though officially Democratic, heavily populated by a conservative Cajun citizenry that places a premium on a politician's personality and personal relationships—a proclivity that plays to Tauzin's strengths. Today, even after two decades in Washington, the congressman is still regarded, say Louisiana political watchers, as the kind of fun-loving, regular Joe you'd enjoy hunting deer with. (And he is reputedly a fantastic shot.) "He's got that Cajun personality," says Baton Rouge–based political analyst John Maginnis, publisher of the *Louisiana Political Fax Weekly*. "He's effusive, high energy, with a good sense of humor." Or, as longtime chum Charlie Melancon puts it: "Billy is a true ... coon-ass. He enjoys people. He enjoys friends, camaraderie, that kind of thing."

Tauzin is not infrequently compared to Louisiana's senior senator, John Breaux, a close friend and fellow Cajun. Both legislators, who met during their law school days at Louisiana State University, are known for their rascally wit, penchant for parties, and shrewd political instincts. Unlike Breaux, however, who made his reputation as a conservative Democrat able to work with Republicans, Tauzin underwent a full-blown partisan conversion mid-career—less out of conviction, posit many, than to advance his own job prospects. In the wake of the 1994 Republican Revolution, Tauzin helped found the Blue Dogs, a coalition of conservative House Democrats named after a Louisiana pop art icon. But, in August 1995, he decided the better course was to jump ship for the GOP—though not before sealing a deal with the newly enthroned Speaker Gingrich that allowed him to keep his seniority and, according to Tauzin, guaranteed him the next chairmanship of the coveted Commerce Committee. Many folks in the Democratic Third District were initially nonplussed by their congressman's switch, says Carol Dantin (himself a Democrat), who has chaired Tauzin's campaigns since day one. Though the

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

Billy Tauzin's Enron hearings helped establish his reputation as a consumer advocate—and deflect accusations that he's in the pocket of his corporate friends.

NEWSCOM/DOUGLAS GRAHAM

region is conservative, he says, "it's hard to take the Cajun people away from the Democratic Party." But Tauzin's political charms quickly smoothed the waters. "By the time he got done with them, they were happy he had done it," recalls Dantin of Tauzin's post-defection visits. "He's a good talker." Come election time, all was forgiven, and Tauzin became the only congressman in memory to run unopposed following a party shift.

PARTY AFFILIATION NOTWITHSTANDING, around Washington Tauzin is best known for taking good care of powerful friends from well beyond his district. He is a die-hard champion of such big-money interests as the broadcast industry, the recording industry, accounting firms, pharmaceutical makers, and the former Baby Bells—and is not shy about using his committee clout to keep government off the back of his corporate pals. The representative spent much of this summer, for instance, blocking a bipartisan push to reverse the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) decision to loosen ownership limits on media conglomerates. With growing public anxiety over Big Media, legislators in both chambers were seeking a rollback, but Tauzin refused even to introduce the matter in committee. Far from chagrined at being the lone obstacle to an important, popular cause, Tauzin's office loudly derided the issue as "a political soap opera" the chairman aimed "to cancel." Just before the August recess, Democrats tacked a rollback amendment onto an appropriations bill that sailed through the full House, skirting Energy and Commerce altogether. Undeterred, Tauzin has vowed to kill the offending provision this fall.

The representative took a similarly combative stand in 2000 against Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Arthur Levitt's push to reform accounting standards. Among other efforts, that April Tauzin and two colleagues penned a letter of protest to Levitt, ominously warning that the SEC needed to justify its entire review of the industry or else risk congressional hearings. Follow-up missives were less overtly threatening but no less critical of Levitt's "ill-advised"—and ultimately doomed—efforts. In January 2002, Representative Dingell summarized the House's anti-reform crusade: "The accounting industry got a bunch of people around here ... to just beat the living hell out of Arthur [Levitt], to threaten his budget, and they intimidated him out of proceeding on the matter." This wasn't the first time Tauzin had been accused of excessive enthusiasm on behalf of his business pals. In 1996, *The Hill* reported that Tauzin's lobbying of the FCC in support of a friend and minor contributor may have led to "the unprecedented reversal of a decision concerning two phone companies in his district [and] appeared to violate FCC rules that bar contact with commissioners concerning pending cases." According to affidavits submitted to the FCC, in 1995 Tauzin twice contacted Commissioner Reed Hundt to express "concern" about the decision to deny two highly lucrative wireless licenses to MobileTel Inc. Shortly thereafter, the FCC reversed its ruling, marking "the first time in the commission's history it has vacated an order before it has been published." Tauzin's office breezily dismissed the matter, insisting that the representative's "routine" inquiries were in no way meant to pressure Hundt. Despite scattered rumblings about an ethics investigation, the matter quietly faded away.

But Tauzin operates with at least as much honey as vinegar, and his skill at wooing supporters to his positions is revered even by the opposition. "He's got very good antenna about who to go to—who would constitute the best ingredients for the soufflé to rise," says Democratic Commerce Committee member Anna Eshoo. Colleagues and fans still talk about Tauzin's masterful 1992 floor speech in favor of ensuring satellite-TV companies access to cable programming, which was credited with single-handedly swaying enough votes to override a presidential veto. ("I still remember the way he pronounced 'consumah,'" says Edward Fritts, head of the National Association of Broadcasters, or NAB.) More recently, in 2001 Tauzin, in defense of his friends in the oil business, labored to kill a proposal

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by fellow Republican Sherwood Boehlert to raise the auto industry's Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards. In the wake of defeat, Boehlert publicly groused to *The Hill* that the smooth-talking Tauzin had effectively torpedoed the amendment despite the fact that his argument "was so far from the truth it didn't pass the laugh test."

Considering his close ties to corporate America—not to mention his oversight role as head of Energy and Commerce—one might expect Tauzin to scrupulously avoid any appearance of conflicts of interest. One would be wrong. Among Congress's most prodigious fund-raisers, Tauzin unabashedly collects millions each election cycle—for both himself and his grateful colleagues—from the myriad business interests acutely aware of his committee's power. Since 1989, for instance, he has been the top House recipient of donations from commercial TV and radio interests, as well as from the accounting profession. In more recent years—reflecting his increased juice as chairman—he has been among the top five House beneficiaries of at least a dozen corporate sectors, ranging from nuclear power to pharmaceuticals. Further raising eyebrows, Tauzin owns a small hunting club on the Maryland shore frequented by many of the same lobbyists courting his committee. One of Tauzin's sons works for BellSouth, his daughter is a former lobbyist for the NAB, and a gaggle of ex-staffers now lobby for interest groups overseen by Energy and Commerce. And, as this magazine has noted, a 2000 report by the Center for Public Integrity shows that, more than any other House member, Tauzin, his wife, and his senior staff are the recipients of corporate media largesse in the form of lavish industry junkets. But, if there is an instance of the representative recusing himself from a legislative or oversight matter to avoid the perception of bias or a case of his returning money from a donor appearing before his committee—as did many legislators during the Enron mess—no one can seem to find it. Rather, Tauzin expresses supreme confidence in his own incorruptibility; his stated position on such matters is invariably: If these folks think that giving me money will buy them influence, they are sadly mistaken.

This corporate coziness has earned Tauzin some harsh critics in the public interest community. His close ties to the nuclear industry make his refusal to hold hearings on the recent problems at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant in Ohio "shocking," "alarming," and "an embarrassment to the committee's authority," says Lisa Gue, senior energy analyst for Public Citizen. More generally, John Dunbar, with the Center for Public Integrity, marvels that Tauzin "accepts extraordinary amounts of money from these businesses that are supposed to be overseen by the Commerce Committee." "He is unquestionably the poster child for corruption in Congress today," says Robert McChesney, a communications professor at the University of Illinois and a leader in the fight against media concentration. "Billy Tauzin is so enmeshed in corruption, so wallowing in the money that surrounds him, that he is incapable of reform."



Tauzin's Cajun charm lets him get away with a degree of sleaze that would land most of his colleagues in hot water.

NEWSCOM/ALEX WONG

NONETHELESS, TAUZIN REMAINS overwhelmingly in the good graces of the press and public, to no small degree because of a fundamental likeability that even his detractors acknowledge. "He seems to get away with a lot of stuff that others would probably be called on the carpet for," says Bob Williams, a senior writer with the Center for Public Integrity. Tauzin does this in part by defusing potentially damaging situations with characteristic drama and a dash of humor. For months, word around Washington was that Tauzin was angling to become the new head of the Recording Industry Association of America, whispering that could have eventually proved detrimental in a number of ways. (Among other things, House ethics rules frown upon such efforts.) But, in early June, for the outgoing president's farewell bash, Tauzin recorded a rap video "auditioning" for the job with Representative Mary Bono—whose name had also been floated—turning the rumor into a joke and

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prompting his office to point out that the representative obviously would not have recorded the spoof if he were seriously eyeing the position.

Tauzin is also unparalleled in working his wiles on a typically adversarial political press. In part, this is a byproduct of his natural pithiness; adrift on a sea of gray, pompous bloviators, Washington reporters delight in such a reliably entertaining quote-meister. (During the Clinton impeachment saga, in which Tauzin publicly played Hamlet to the hilt, the representative came out with a long, involved quote comparing Clinton's repentance process to the lyrics of the song "Margaritaville," prompting the esteemed Tim Russert to express envy that he hadn't gotten "the 'Margaritaville' thing" on his show first.) Perhaps just as vitally, Tauzin's office tirelessly courts the media. In September 2000, for instance, *Roll Call* reported that, on the eve of the Firestone hearings, the representative (then a mere subcommittee chairman) sat down for no fewer than 20 TV interviews, six radio interviews, and "a one-on-one session with every major newspaper in the country." Such promotion provokes occasional sniping from colleagues who see Tauzin as trying to hog the spotlight. "To them, the media is everything," says a Republican Hill source, noting that, when Tauzin wants to insert himself into a developing story (even one arguably beyond his purview), his strategy is to call a news conference—even if he has no news to announce. The Martha Stewart hearings were a perfect example, says the source. After all their investigating, Tauzin's office made a big to-do on a Thursday about how they would present their findings the next Monday, only to announce that the committee would pass its work to the Justice Department for investigation—something committees do all the time. But, the source admits, Tauzin's media mojo lets him get away with all sorts of self-serving antics. "The media love him. ... And no one wants to be cut off."

Arguably nowhere do Tauzin's charisma and media genius play out more perfectly than in committee hearings. The events themselves are works of art, stage-managed down to the placement of props (such as photos of blown Firestone tires). And Tauzin, ever the showman, employs a straight-talking, fiery interrogation style aimed both at rattling witnesses and winning him kudos—not to mention maximum air time—from the media. ("How many people died unnecessarily?" he raged at Firestone execs.) As *USA Today* noted last summer, "[N]o one has turned humdrum legislative process into made-for-TV melodrama like Energy and Commerce Chairman W.J. 'Billy' Tauzin."

But the hearings are often little more than shrewd political theater. "He has two dances," says Gary Ruskin, who runs Ralph Nader's Congressional Accountability Project. "One is the legislative dance—and that's the one that really counts. That's where he pays off his debt. But then there's the actor's dance that he does as a committee chairman. And that's when he shows his populist stripe, because it matters less there." Tauzin goes easy on corporations in the legislative arena—which is what the party leadership expects, says Ruskin. "But that doesn't mean that he can't hold high-profile hearings where he can very flashily tear apart, say, the Firestone people." "He's good at kind of the show hearing," sniffs the Republican Hill source, noting that Tauzin's inclination to convene a hearing tends to be directly proportional to a subject's potential for buzz. (Thus, the networks' coverage of election night 2000 merited hearings, while major problems at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant did not.) Of course, when it comes to follow-up or enacting legislation, the source notes—and various political watchers have pointed out—Tauzin "has a pretty poor record."

But follow-up isn't the point: The hearings themselves have inherent value, providing valuable political cover both for Tauzin specifically and his party in general. Take Enron: As one of the party's top funders, Enron could have proved politically devastating if the public had suspected the GOP was not properly outraged over the meltdown. Tauzin's hearings helped convey that outrage. "People are glad Tauzin is being aggressive and is out there," a Republican leadership aide told the *Los Angeles Times* at the time. "We take this very seriously. We need to appear to be on top of the game. We cannot let the Democrats take the field."

Similarly, for Tauzin such hearings establish his reputation as an energetic friend of the consumer, helping deflect any accusations that he's in the pocket of his corporate friends. (Even good-government types at places like Public Citizen offer occasional praise of Tauzin's performances as Grand Inquisitor.) As Thomas Mann, a congressional scholar at the Brookings Institution, remarked of Tauzin's hearings to the *Los Angeles Times* last year, "He knows that the best defense is a good offense." And, when questioned about apparent inconsistencies between his past legislative positions and his critical stance at hearings, Tauzin simply expresses shock—shock!—and insists that there was no way to predict how badly things would go awry. As his Enron probe caught fire, Tauzin declared, "We're finding out that there are real problems endemic in the structure of corporate America that we need to deal with." Of course, after experiencing a number of such epiphanies in recent years, you'd think Tauzin would start to reconsider his deregulatory mania a bit.

To a certain degree, however, Tauzin's willingness to unapologetically change courses midstream and to pooh-pooh conventional political concerns, such as hypocrisy or the appearance of corruption, are part of what make him seem so appealingly genuine, even to his foes. "To his credit, he's not trying to hide what he is," says McChesney. "I haven't found him to be an ambiguous character." Tauzin's fans, naturally, are even more effusive. "Even when he disagrees with you, at least you know where you stand," says Mitch Glazer, a top lobbyist with the recording industry. "You sort of appreciate when somebody is up front with you and tells you what they think." "There's no mystique here," agrees the NAB's Fritts. "It's all Billy. What you see is what you get." And that is precisely the problem. ■

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

STANLEY KAUFFMANN ON FILMS

Odd Gratifications

SOFIA COPPOLA'S FIRST FILM, *The Virgin Suicides,* was a daring choice for a debut. It was about five young sisters who killed themselves for shadowy reasons, and Coppola rendered the mystery of the story so well that absolute clarity would have debased it. Now, for her second film, she has made an equally daring choice. **LOST IN TRANSLATION** is about an affair that is unconsummated and whose non-consummation is oddly gratifying.

LOST IN TRANSLATION
(Focus)

LENI RIEFENSTAHL

Coppola adapted her first film from a novel; this new screenplay is original. This in itself is good news—that this woman, still young, conceived this offbeat idea and wrote it so well. The theme is not blazingly new: *Brief Encounter* and *Roman Holiday* and (even though the lovers do go to bed) *The Bridges of Madison County* hover in the air above it. But Coppola's characters and setting are very much her own, and that setting complements the story.

Bob Harris is a fading American film star in his fifties who goes to Tokyo to make a Japanese whiskey commercial for a fee that will amply cushion his fading. Charlotte (last name not given) is the young American wife of a young photographer who is in Japan on an assignment. They are all staying in an ultra-luxe hotel, and when Charlotte's husband is away for a week, the inevitable does not happen. Bob and Charlotte encounter casually in the hotel, and both know very early that they like each other. They meet quite often in the next few days, in the hotel and out in the city. Tokyo's mix of the familiar (neon and skyscrapers) and the remote (language and customs) seems to press the pair together. They are found, rather than lost, in this translation to another world. She knows that he is married (twenty-five years) and has children. He knows that she, a recent Yale graduate, is an even more recent bride. Both know, from life and from the fiction about such meetings, what could happen. They treat the possibility of an affair like a gift that they had better not open.

Bob's filming activity in Tokyo is splashed before us comically—the shooting of the simple commercial by a very artistic young Japanese director, the torrent of handshakes and bowings that almost every visitor to Japan must brave. (Is there another country where attendants bow to you when you enter or leave a hotel elevator or come down a department-store escalator?) We see somewhat less of Charlotte's doings, but then there aren't many for her. She tells Bob that she was a philosophy major and that she does not know what she wants to do with her life: we see her not doing it. Always, through their few days together, there is the tacit pull between them that they are both resisting and enjoying. They resist because they know that only heartache could follow for them, that this hotel in a foreign country has thrown them together for the equivalent of a shipboard romance. When Bob does leave for home, the poignancy—though it could have been stronger—is strong enough to suggest what it would have been if they had been lovers.

Possibly because she was working in Japan, Coppola has invoked a mode familiar from a few of the best Japanese directors, especially the great Yasujiro Ozu. Silence—achingly implicative silence. None of the feelings that are writhing within Bob and Charlotte are ever spoken: there isn't even oblique reference to them. In her lesser but legitimate measure, Coppola clearly believes, à la Ozu, that film itself by its immediacy can do most of the speaking. Simply through the very presence of these two people, in our knowledge of them, in our following them in the commonest activities—his shaving in his room, her lolling in hers—the silent ostinato of their feeling for each other flows beneath.

Bill Murray, who plays Bob, has spent much of his career implying more than he says. Usually this has been in comedy (*Groundhog Day,* for instance), but here, where the only comedy is in Bob's occasional efforts not to be heavy, Murray comes fairly close to full taciturn pathos. His secret dissatisfaction with himself, his silent scorn for the work he is doing, are humorously clear. But Bob's hunger for another lifetime that cannot happen, a life with Charlotte, is not as moving as it ought to be. Murray's palette does not have quite enough of that color. Scarlett Johansson, as Charlotte, is emotionally lucid and appealing. But her voice is not yet adequate to her feelings.

Coppola's opening shot is good if misleading. Johansson is prone in her panties with her back to us, motionless. Just because she merely lies there for a minute or so, the shot stimulates conjectures about what is ahead. But those conjectures have nothing to do with what does follow. After this misleading shot, however, Coppola handles her film with very pleasant economy, with a kind of warm precision. Her father, who was one of this picture's producers, can be as proud of her as we are grateful.

Taking Sides, reviewed here two weeks ago, dealt with the post–World War II inquiry into the alleged Nazi activities of the conductor Wilhelm Furtwängler, with the possibility of separating art and politics. After considerable trouble he won his argument that, for him, the two were separable. On September 8, Leni Riefenstahl died at the age of 101—an artist under Hitler who had very little trouble with the American authorities in freeing her art of political guilt. Yet this was a film-maker whose two major works were celebrations of Hitlerism: the documentaries *Triumph of the Will* and *Olympia.* The former, a film that is still frightening nearly sixty years after Hitler's death, glorified a gigantic Nazi rally in Nurem-

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berg in 1934. *Olympia* celebrated the 1936 Olympics in Berlin, and again was a swelling hymn to Nazi principles. Despite these films, despite the innumerable photographs and accounts of Riefenstahl's association with Hitler and her praise of him, she was very quickly de-Nazified by the American occupation command.

She certainly must have had charm: in her autobiography she recounts how, during the days of Army inquiry, she was invited to tea by top officers. She certainly had unique talent: her worst despisers (I am one) cannot deny it. Before the war she had starred in Alpine films in which her physical feats were astounding. After some twenty years of postwar inactivity, she became a photographer, most notably of the Nuba in Africa, and at the age of seventy-one she learned to scuba dive and did underwater photography.

Her later life, because it was so extraordinary, seemed an attempt to counterbalance her past with apolitical dazzle. When questioned about her work for the Nazis, she always responded that she had never actually joined the Nazi Party and that she had changed her views in 1944 (as did other Nazi supporters when they saw that Hitler was going to lose). She made her own subsequent attempts to separate art from politics. She would often say, "I didn't do any harm to anyone. What have I ever done? What am I guilty of?" I haven't yet read the response that could have been made: "Your work—in fact, your best work—helped inspire millions to do enormous harm."

Riefenstahl's plea of political innocence can be settled with one question. If Hitler had won, wouldn't he have made her the queen of Third Reich filmmaking? He happened to lose, so she became non-Nazi. It was possibly ignoble of me, but the news of her death gave me a surge of schadenfreude. ■

DAVID HAJDU ON MUSIC
This Year's Model

WHY DON'T WE LET rock stars grow up? The pop music domain is like a confederation of Never-Never Land and the Island of Lost Boys, where nobody can ever grow old and nasty behavior is the social code. It is some fifty years now since rock and roll began to emerge as a musical style and a cultural phenomenon, originally of a piece with the adolescent rebellion against postwar conservatism that the rebelled-upon used to call juvenile delinquency. The music's surviving originators—Chuck Berry, Bo Diddley, Little Richard, and Jerry Lee Lewis, most of them now septuagenarians—continue to make their livings singing the same raucous, primal tunes about high school, fast cars, and sex to aging fans who may not have experienced some of those things in a while. No matter that Berry would rather be performing Tin Pan Alley standards such as "I'm Through With Love," nor that Diddley is constantly writing new material few people care to hear, nor that Little Richard, an ordained Seventh-Day Adventist minister, prefers to sing gospel music. (Jerry Lee Lewis is congenitally delinquent, but that's another issue.) Rock and roll is here to stay put.

Disposed to more expansive conceptions of rock's potential, venturesome musicians of succeeding eras—such as Bob Dylan, the Beatles, Marvin Gaye, Pete Townshend, and their heirs—have stretched and re-shaped rock and roll innumerable times, and many others, including Paul McCartney, Joe Jackson, and Stewart Copeland (the former drummer for the Police and no relation to Aaron Copland, though he refers to the composer as his "honorary uncle"), have dropped the genre—temporarily, as a rule—to experiment with classical forms such as the symphony and the oratorio and the opera. Still, we tend to prefer our rockers young and angry. We look cynically upon overt demonstrations of creative ambition as over-reaching, especially when popular artists dare to cross the chalk lines of category and genre. We dismiss as pretentious their efforts in musical styles positioned above rock on the artistic hierarchy, which is unfair regardless of the fact that McCartney's *Liverpool Oratorio,* for example, is indeed terminally pretentious. (A few of McCartney's less grandiose concert pieces, among them a tuneful piano study called "A Leaf," have a genial charm.) Many of us of the postwar generation submit to a kind of philistine elitism, rejecting the privilege of an artist successful in an informal discipline to attempt a formal art, because we see the latter as bourgeois and the interest in it as a betrayal of the anti-establishment ethic to which rock and roll still lays claim, decades after it became the music of the establishment. By the same token, we are quick to embrace the latest young group of rough-hewn bad boys (Pantera, Turbonegro) and to exalt them for their puerility and their crudity.

I SUSPECT THAT THOUGHTS OF THIS sort have occasionally struck Elvis Costello, whose brave, mercurial career achieves a dénouement this month with the release of *North,* his twenty-fourth album, a collection of somber art songs in the vein of Kurt Weill and Bertolt Brecht. Asked about the title, Costello has explained: "That's where I'm headed." Clearly he sees the project as a mark of his creative progress; he has noted that he wrote all the songs at the piano, like the composers in our mental image of the great masters, rather than on the guitar, historically the instrument of vernacular musicians. He also wrote the album's orchestrations for twenty-eight strings and nine horns (using a pencil on music paper, not a computer), and he conducted the orchestra himself. "I don't think the New York Philharmonic is going to call me up," he joked to *Rolling Stone.* Then again, Costello did not call Lorin Maazel. Twenty-six years after he borrowed Huey Lewis's backup band to make his first album for a start-up punk-rock label called Stiff Records, Costello could assume the podium to lead a sizable orchestra on a recording for Deutsche Grammophon. To misquote the title of his famous second album, this year's is a luxury model.

The route that Costello has followed to northerly artistic territory has been serpentine, with pins all over the musical map. Raised in Birkenhead, across the Mersey River from Liverpool, he started

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in his teens as a pub-band singer and songwriter indebted to the Beatles and their influences—that is, to all of pop music history. His debut LP, *My Aim Is True,* which appeared in 1977, was an international hit of the punk/New Wave years, and permanently cemented his public image as a volatile nerd, somewhat obscuring the discipline and the sophistication already evident in songs such as "Alison" and "Watching the Detectives." Following a series of infectious, aggressively clever albums made with his deft little band, the Attractions, Costello took a hard turn westward and released an album of his favorite country tunes called *Almost Blue,* performed demurely, with reverence, in 1981. Costello's audience started looking for the exits.

In the 1980s, Costello reached his maturity as a pop songwriter, producing a fine collection of buoyant tunes about betrayal, duplicity, and related hazards of his romantic paradigm in *Imperial Bedroom* (1982), as well as a couple of near-equals in *King of America* (1986) and *Spike* (1989), the latter a wildly eclectic pastiche of things from several albums that Costello had abandoned. "By the time I got to my fifth album, by the early eighties, I wasn't listening to pop music—I was listening to all jazz," Costello told the music journalist Fred Schruers. "You can hear [that] the shape of songs starts to change." Though he was still writing in the pop milieu and would have a hit from time to time (such as *Spike*'s "Veronica," co-written with McCartney), the growing subtlety of his lyrics (which relied less on gimmickry and shock value, and more on narrative detail) and the complexity of his music (which broke away from traditional popular-song forms and broadened harmonically to accommodate a diversity of guest musicians, including jazz bassist Ray Brown and the Dirty Dozen Jazz Band) were making Costello an increasingly specialized taste.

What had happened was that he was asking to be taken seriously, much to the puzzlement of fans who had always mistaken him for a musically gifted novelty act. Stage-named like a cartoon character and decked out like one in oversized horn-rims and pompadour, Costello allowed himself to be packaged as punk's delegate to the house of Spike Jones and Ray Stevens, and when he started crooning "Almost Blue" (a ballad highlight of *Imperial Bedroom,* not on the earlier album of the same title), his audience heard the second act of *Pagliacci.* What was so rattling about Costello's change was that he was not being ironic. Ever since McCartney started putting music-hall numbers such as "When I'm Sixty-Four" on Beatles albums, listeners have been primed to accept pre-rock styles only if they are used ironically—a generous misreading of the sentimental Paulie's likely intentions, I suspect.

COSTELLO, WHO TURNED FORTY in 1994, spent most of the 1990s trying to figure out how to be a grown-up musician. For starters, he grew a beard, which in time became enormous. (My son has a theory that the self-seriousness of each of the Beatles' music was directly proportionate to the mass of his facial hair, and the evidence is persuasive.) Costello turned to styles and forms of music that are traditionally deemed more serious than rock, pop, or country: jazz and formal composition. He sang with the Jazz Passengers and the Mingus Big Band (adding lyrics to several Mingus compositions as well); and he accepted two commissions to compose orchestral scores, one in 1991 for the BBC television drama *G.B.H.,* the second, four years later, for the BBC mini-series *Jake's Progress.* Both were written in collaboration with the prolific British screen composer Richard Harvey, who helped to translate Costello's melodies into musical notation.

Frustrated by his musical illiteracy but emboldened by confidence in his talent, Costello set out to learn how to read and write the music that he could always hear and play on the guitar. "I realized it was really self-defeating to maintain this mental block that I had about musical notation," he explained to the journalist Christopher Porter.

> I wasn't able to communicate very accurately to [the orchestra]. I had done some film music where I had composed the themes, but they'd always had to be orchestrated by other people.... I was very frustrated that some ideas were getting bent out of shape, so I enlisted some help ... and I got through this mental block [about notation].... It's a very foolish one to describe, but I got through it, and within six months I was writing four-part string parts. And now I just wrote [a] two-hundred-page orchestral score with a pencil. So, I learned really fast. I've always been able to hear harmony really clearly, so it wasn't a question of I didn't understand the music. I understood very well what I was doing. I just had no need to write it down [before].

As Costello must have known, there is more to music theory than a gifted musician could intuit with the keenest ear for harmony (there are counterpoint and form, for instance), and composing orchestral music is as much a matter of learning notation as writing a novel is a matter of learning the alphabet. It is a marvel that the string-quartet settings that he composed in 1993 for *The Juliet Letters,* an album of songs featuring the Brodsky Quartet, are so lovely—simple and largely imitative, but gently appealing. Lyrically, the record was a nostalgic homage to epistolary expression, and it was the same thing musically; Costello had become enchanted with the act of putting pen to paper while the rest of world was lost in computers.

Costello gave his curiosity free rein over the musical landscape. Before he was finished with the 1990s, he had made a burnished album of ballads co-written with Burt Bacharach, the grand old lion of refined commercial pop; he had written songs with or for Aimee Mann, Johnny Cash, Roger McGuinn, Bonnie Raitt, and Paul McCartney (with whom he had started writing in the 1980s); he had composed an entire album of new tunes for the folkish British provocateur Wendy James; and he had performed with the uncategorizable American guitarist Bill Frisell—in addition to all his other work in pop, jazz, and formal music. A Google search of "Elvis Costello" and "eclectic" generates more than ten thousand hits, most of them involving his work in the last decade. Little of this genre-roving has sat particularly well with the pop audience, which prefers its explorers to cross borders of place rather than time. Costello's breach of rock protocol is his pursuit of musical styles associated with the past or with older people, such as country, classical music, Tin Pan Alley, folk-rock, and the rest, instead of contemporary musics of places such as Africa, Cuba, or the Middle East, which are seen as cool.

Costello (like Paul McCartney and Jerry Garcia) is the son of a big-band musician, and his childhood of singing standards in parlor musicales (as both McCartney and Garcia did with their fathers) has informed his own music (as it has or did in the cases of McCartney and

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Garcia, the latter of whom was named for Jerome Kern). Costello's father, Ross MacManus, a bebop trumpeter who became fairly well known in Britain as a vocalist for a Glenn Miller–style pop ensemble called the Joe Loss Orchestra, had used the pseudonym Day Costello—his grandmother's surname—when he did some moonlighting from his duties for Loss. (MacManus even had a minor hit under the Costello name, a rendition of McCartney's wholly unironic ballad "The Long and Winding Road," in 1970.) His son Declan's first words were supposedly "skin, mommy"—an entreaty to hear his favorite record at the time, Frank Sinatra's exultant rendition of Cole Porter's "I've Got You Under My Skin." In taking up rock and roll under a stage name, he became the Elvis of the Costellos; and, now approaching fifty—Ross MacManus's age when *My Aim Is True* was released—Costello is making much the same kind of music that his father was singing while he was establishing a musical identity of his own.

North begins well, with a gray-hued orchestral prologue reminiscent of Leonard Bernstein's "Chichester Psalms," and most of what follows remains in the Bernstein mode, straddling the poles of serious concert music and serious popular song. The former clearly exerts the stronger pull upon Costello these days, as it did upon Bernstein in his later years. Stephen Sondheim has said that his *West Side Story* collaborator contracted "importantitis," a condition to which age increases an artist's susceptibility; and Costello is apparently not immune to it. His latest music has a self-consciousness that tends to overwhelm its humor (mainly in the lyrics) and its spontaneity (care of the jazz soloists Lee Konitz on alto saxophone and Lew Soloff on muted trumpet).

There are ten songs on *North*, and purchasers of the CD also get individual passcodes to allow them to download one more selection—the title song, as a matter of fact. (I'm not entirely sure how this arrangement will work, but the gimmick seems moot, since the whole CD has already shown up on websites for free downloading.) The songs have a common sound: all are ballads, most of them exceedingly slow, and their style is an angular sort of quasi-recitative, out of tempo. They are much like the contemporary musical-theater writing of young composers such as Adam Guettel, in which melodic phrases wander, abruptly halt, jerk about, and take acrobatic leaps with little provocation, and in which the natural cadence of the words does not necessarily fit the music with the kind of precision fundamental to earlier theater-song craftspeople such as Guettel's grandfather Richard Rodgers and his main collaborators, Lorenz Hart and Oscar Hammerstein II. Costello sings, "But ... if-I'd-only-known ... that this would BE the last lov-ING remark ... you left me IN the dark." In contemporary pop music, such erratic phrasing is the norm; indeed, it is arguably an essential attribute, part of the music's treasured rawness. I presume that Costello does not hear his jagged writing as untidy—or, if he does, that he prefers to keep things a little messy as a matter of generational pride.

Costello need not have explained that he composed all the pieces on *North* at the piano. Listening to the music, one can picture him at the keyboard, following the scales with his hands cupped in place.


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In "You Turned to Me," for instance, he moves down the scale in C major, making impressive-sounding augmented chords with small variations on simple triads. Costello has gone all mushy for augmented chords, which sound jazzy and sophisticated, and he is nearly as charmed by the Dorian mode, which can have an eerie quality. His mastery of these devices is still developing; at points Costello's harmony is arbitrarily complex, not yet organic. Compositionally, much of *North* sounds like exercises, although that is to Costello's credit, in one sense. (He and I are roughly the same age, and I find it progressively more difficult to get myself to do exercises of any sort.) That Costello has the wherewithal to try a new musical instrument and to learn a new set of skills is remarkable in itself, and the resulting music is far more interesting than hearing him play "Pump It Up" for the jillionth time. (Costello plays piano—in a manner so spare it is nearly absent—on two tracks of *North,* and his longtime keyboardist Steve Nieve plays much the same way on all the others.)

Lyrically, *North* has Costello's most disciplined writing—not his most dynamic (*This Year's Model*) nor his most imaginative (*Imperial Bedroom*), but his most conversational, his simplest. Habitually verbose, Costello barely sounds like himself here. Each song on *North* has fewer than half the words of a typical selection on any previous Elvis Costello album, and they are employed with uncommon restraint. Only once does Costello use Tin Pan Alley clichés, in "I'm In the Mood Again," and he does so with a theatrical wink: "I lay my head down on fine linens and satin/Away from the madhatters who live in Manhattan/The Empire State Building illuminating the sky/I'm in the mood, I'm in the mood, I'm in the mood again." The language is mostly personal and intimate, with Costello assuming fewer roles than usual. He is singing as himself, celebrating love and bemoaning its futility, and ruminating on the passage of time: "I never did what I was told/I trampled though the amber and the burnished gold/But now I clearly see how cruel the young can be."

Modulating his voice to accommodate the material, Costello sings his sedate new songs in a more tempered version of the mellow baritone into which he has shifted for ballads since he crooned "My Funny Valentine" on the B-side of a single in 1978. Some of his old fans have belittled him for trying to be Frank Sinatra, but the classic pop singer to whom he is most indebted is Billy Eckstine, the original musically adventurous jazz-pop vocalist with a bad-boy reputation and a throbbing vibrato. I know Costello is an admirer of the late "Mr. B" because I saw him sitting with his mother and studying Eckstine in performance at the Blue Note nightclub in Manhattan sometime in the late 1980s. It was a strange, grim evening. Eckstine, while vigorous and in good voice, had fallen into disfavor and was struggling to reclaim his lost glory. As his finale, he fumbled through a pandering medley of recent pop hits far beneath an artist with his gifts—"Love the One You're With" and "Walk a Mile in My Shoes," I remember, and something else of that ilk, maybe "Gentle on My Mind." *North* may be a flawed effort, but its defects are aspirational, and I would rather suffer them than watch another great artist go south. ■

Amartya Sen

Democracy and Its Global Roots

Why democratization is not the same as Westernization.

I.

THERE IS NO MYSTERY IN THE fact that the immediate prospects of democracy in Iraq, to be ushered in by the American-led alliance, are being viewed with increasing skepticism. The evident ambiguities in the goals of the occupation and the lack of clarity about the process of democratization make these doubts inescapable. But it would be a serious mistake to translate these uncertainties about the immediate prospects of a democratic Iraq into a larger case for skepticism about the general possibility of—and indeed the need for—having democracy in Iraq, or in any other country that is deprived of it. Nor is there a general ground here for uneasiness about providing global support for the struggle for democracy around the world, which is the most profound challenge of our times. Democracy movements across the globe (in South Africa and Argentina and Indonesia yesterday, in Burma and Zimbabwe and elsewhere today) reflect people's determination to fight for political participation and an effective voice. Apprehensions about current events in Iraq have to be seen in their specific context; there is a big world beyond.

It is important to consider, in the broader arena, two general objections to the advocacy of democracy that have recently gained much ground in international debates and which tend to color discussions of foreign affairs, particularly in America and Europe. There are, first, doubts about what democracy can achieve in poorer countries. Is democracy not a barrier that obstructs the process of development and deflects attention from the priorities of economic and social change, such as providing adequate food, raising income per head, and carrying out institutional reform? It is also argued that democratic governance can be deeply illiberal and can inflict suffering on those who do not belong to the ruling majority in a democracy. Are vulnerable groups not better served by the protection that authoritarian governance can provide?

The second line of attack concentrates on historical and cultural doubts about advocating democracy for people who do not, allegedly, "know" it. The endorsement of democracy as a general rule for all people, whether by national or international bodies or by human rights activists, is frequently castigated on the ground that it involves an attempted imposition of Western values and Western

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practices on non-Western societies. The argument goes much beyond acknowledging that democracy is a predominantly Western practice in the contemporary world, as it certainly is. It takes the form of presuming that democracy is an idea of which the roots can be found exclusively in some distinctively Western thought that has flourished uniquely in Europe—and nowhere else—for a very long time.

These are legitimate and cogent questions, and they are, understandably, being asked with some persistence. But are these misgivings really well-founded? In arguing that they are not, it is important to note that these lines of criticism are not altogether unlinked. Indeed, the flaws in both lie primarily in the attempt to see democracy in an unduly narrow and restricted way—in particular, exclusively in terms of public balloting and not much more broadly, in terms of what John Rawls called "the exercise of public reason." This more capacious concept includes the opportunity for citizens to participate in political discussions and so to be in a position to influence public choice. In understanding where the two lines of attack on democratization respectively go wrong, it is crucial to appreciate that democracy has demands that transcend the ballot box.

Indeed, voting is only one way—though certainly a very important way—of making public discussions effective, when the opportunity to vote is combined with the opportunity to speak, and to listen, without fear. The force and the reach of elections depend critically on the opportunity for open public discussion. Balloting alone can be woefully inadequate, as is abundantly illustrated by the astounding electoral victories of ruling tyrannies in authoritarian regimes, from Stalin's Soviet Union to Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The problem in these cases lies not just in the pressure that is brought to bear on voters in the act of balloting itself, but in the way public discussion of failures and transgressions is thwarted by censorship, suppression of political opposition, and violations of basic civil rights and political freedoms.

The need to take a broader view of democracy—going well beyond the freedom of elections and ballots—has been extensively discussed not only in contemporary political philosophy, but also in the new disciplines of social choice theory and public choice theory, influenced by economic reasoning as well as by political ideas. The process of decision-making through discussion can enhance information about a society and about individual priorities, and those priorities may respond to public deliberation. As James Buchanan, the leading public choice theorist, argues, "The definition of democracy as 'government by discussion' implies that individual values can and do change in the process of decision-making."

All this raises deep questions about the dominant focus on balloting and elections in the literature on world affairs, and about the adequacy of the view, well articulated by Samuel P. Huntington in *The Third Wave,* that "elections, open, free and fair, are the essence of democracy, the inescapable sine qua non." In the broader perspective of public reasoning, democracy has to give a central place to guaranteeing free public discussion and deliberative interactions in political thought and practice—not just through elections nor just for elections. What is required, as Rawls observed, is the safeguarding of "diversity of doctrines—the fact of pluralism," which is central to "the public culture of modern democracies," and which must be secured in a democracy by "basic rights and liberties."

The broader view of democracy in terms of public reasoning also allows us to understand that the roots of democracy go much beyond the narrowly confined chronicles of some designated practices that are now seen as specifically "democratic institutions." This basic recognition was clear enough to Tocqueville. In 1835, in *Democracy in America,* he noted that the "great democratic revolution" then taking place could be seen, from one point of view, as "a new thing," but it could also be seen, from a broader perspective, as part of "the most continuous, ancient, and permanent tendency known to history." Although he confined his historical examples to Europe's past (pointing to the powerful contribution toward democratization made by the admission of common people to the ranks of clergy in "the state of France seven hundred years ago"), Tocqueville's general argument has immensely broader relevance.

The championing of pluralism, diversity, and basic liberties can be found in the history of many societies. The long traditions of encouraging and protecting public debates on political, social, and cultural matters in, say, India, China, Japan, Korea, Iran, Turkey, the Arab world, and

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

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many parts of Africa, demand much fuller recognition in the history of democratic ideas. This global heritage is ground enough to question the frequently reiterated view that democracy is just a Western idea, and that democracy is therefore just a form of Westernization. The recognition of this history has direct relevance in contemporary politics in pointing to the global legacy of protecting and promoting social deliberation and pluralist interactions, which cannot be any less important today than they were in the past when they were championed.

IN HIS AUTOBIOGRAPHY, *Long Walk to Freedom,* Nelson Mandela describes how impressed he was, as a young boy, by the democratic nature of the proceedings of the local meetings that were held in the regent's house in Mqhekezweni:

> Everyone who wanted to speak did so. It was democracy in its purest form. There may have been a hierarchy of importance among the speakers, but everyone was heard, chief and subject, warrior and medicine man, shopkeeper and farmer, landowner and laborer.... The foundation of self-government was that all men were free to voice their opinions and equal in their value as citizens.

Meyer Fortes and Edward E. Evans-Pritchard, the great anthropologists of Africa, argued in their classic book *African Political Systems,* published more than sixty years ago, that "the structure of an African state implies that kings and chiefs rule by consent." There might have been some over-generalization in this, as critics argued later; but there can be little doubt about the traditional role and the continuing relevance of accountability and participation in African political heritage. To overlook all this, and to regard the fight for democracy in Africa only as an attempt to import from abroad the "Western idea" of democracy, would be a profound misunderstanding. Mandela's "long walk to freedom" began distinctly at home.

Nowhere in the contemporary world is the need for more democratic engagement stronger than in Africa. The continent has suffered greatly from the domination of authoritarianism and military rule in the late twentieth century, following the formal closure of the British, French, Portuguese, and Belgian empires. Africa also had the misfortune of being caught right in the middle of the Cold War, in which each of the superpowers cultivated military rulers friendly to itself and hostile to the enemy. No military usurper of civilian authority ever lacked a superpower friend, linked with it in a military alliance. A continent that seemed in the 1950s to be poised to develop democratic politics in newly independent countries was soon being run by an assortment of strongmen who were linked to one side or the other in the militancy of the Cold War. They competed in despotism with apartheid-based South Africa.

That picture is slowly changing now, with post-apartheid South Africa playing a leading part. But, as Anthony Appiah has argued, "ideological decolonization is bound to fail if it neglects either endogenous 'tradition' or exogenous 'Western' ideas." Even as specific democratic institutions developed in the West are welcomed and put into practice, the task requires an adequate understanding of the deep roots of democratic thought in Africa itself. Similar issues arise, with varying intensity, in other parts of the non-Western world as they struggle to introduce or consolidate democratic governance.

II.

THE IDEA THAT DEMOCRACY IS an essentially Western notion is sometimes linked to the practice of voting and elections in ancient Greece, specifically in Athens from the fifth century B.C.E. In the evolution of democratic ideas and practices it is certainly important to note the remarkable role of Athenian direct democracy, starting from Cleisthenes's pioneering move toward public balloting around 506 B.C.E. The term "democracy" derives from the Greek words for "people" (*demos*) and "authority" (*kratia*). Although many people in Athens—women and slaves in particular—were not citizens and did not have the right to vote, the vast importance of the Athenian practice of the sharing of political authority deserves unequivocal acknowledgment.

But to what extent does this make democracy a basically Western concept? There are two major difficulties in taking this view. The first problem concerns the importance of public reasoning, which takes us beyond the narrow perspective of public balloting. Athens itself was extremely distinguished in encouraging public discussion, as was ancient Greece in general. But the Greeks were not unique in this respect, even among ancient civilizations, and there is an extensive history of the cultivation of tolerance, pluralism, and public deliberation in other societies as well.

The second difficulty concerns the partitioning of the world into discrete civilizations with geographical correlates, in which ancient Greece is seen as part and parcel of an identifiable "Western" tradition. Not only is this a difficult thing to do given the diverse history of different parts of Europe, but it is also hard to miss an implicit element of racist thinking in such wholesale reduction of Western civilization to Greek antiquity. In this perspective, no great difficulty is perceived in seeing the descendants of, say, Goths and Visigoths and other Europeans as the inheritors of the Greek tradition ("they are all Europeans"), while there is great reluctance to take note of the Greek intellectual links with ancient Egyptians, Iranians, and Indians, despite the greater interest that the ancient Greeks themselves showed—as recorded in contemporary accounts—in talking to them (rather than in chatting with the ancient Goths).

Such discussions often concerned issues that are directly or indirectly relevant to democratic ideas. When Alexander asked a group of Jain philosophers in India why they were paying so little attention to the great conqueror, he got the following reply, which directly questioned the legitimacy of inequality: "King Alexander, every man can possess only so much of the earth's surface as this we are standing on. You are but human like the rest of us, save that you are always busy and up to no good, traveling so many miles from your home, a nuisance to yourself and to others! ... You will soon be dead, and then you will own just as much of the earth as will suffice to bury you." Arrian reports that Alexander responded to this egalitarian reproach with the same kind of admiration as he had shown in his encounter with Diogenes, even though his actual conduct remained unchanged ("the exact opposite of what he then professed to admire"). Classifying the world of ideas in terms of shared racial characteristics of proximate populations is hardly a wonderful basis for categorizing the history of thought.

Nor does it take into account how intellectual influences travel or how parallel developments take place in a world

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linked by ideas rather than by race. There is nothing to indicate that the Greek experience in democratic governance had much immediate impact in the countries to the west of Greece and Rome—in, say, France or Germany or Britain. By contrast, some of the contemporary cities in Asia—in Iran, Bactria, and India—incorporated elements of democracy in municipal governance, largely under Greek influence. For several centuries after the time of Alexander, for example, the city of Susa in southwest Iran had an elected council, a popular assembly, and magistrates who were proposed by the council and elected by the assembly. There is also considerable evidence of elements of democratic governance at the local level in India and Bactria over that period.

It must be noted, of course, that such overtures were almost entirely confined to local governance, but it would nevertheless be a mistake to dismiss these early experiences of participatory governance as insignificant for the global history of democracy. The seriousness of this neglect has to be assessed in light of the particular importance of local politics in the history of democracy, including the city-republics that would emerge more than a millennium later in Italy, from the eleventh century onward. As Benjamin I. Schwartz pointed out in his great book *The World of Thought in Ancient China,* "Even in the history of the West, with its memories of Athenian 'democracy,' the notion that democracy cannot be implemented in large territorial states requiring highly centralized power remained accepted wisdom as late as Montesquieu and Rousseau."

Indeed, these histories often play inspirational roles and prevent a sense of distance from democratic ideas. When India became independent in 1947, the political discussions that led to a fully democratic constitution, making India the largest democracy in the twentieth century, not only included references to Western experiences in democracy but also recalled India's own traditions. Jawaharlal Nehru put particular emphasis on the tolerance of heterodoxy and pluralism in the political rules of Indian emperors such as Ashoka and Akbar. The encouragement of public discussion by those tolerant political orders was recollected and evocatively linked to India's modern multi-party constitution.

There was also, as it happens, considerable discussion in the early years of Indian independence of whether the organization of "the ancient polity of India" could serve as the model for India's constitution in the twentieth century, though that idea was actually even less plausible than would have been any attempt to construct the constitution of the United States in 1776 in line with Athenian practices of the fifth century B.C.E. The chair of the committee that drafted the Indian constitution, B. R. Ambedkar, went in some detail into the history of local democratic governance in India to assess whether it could fruitfully serve as a model for modern Indian democracy. Ambedkar's conclusion was that it should definitely not be given that role, particularly because localism generated "narrow-mindedness and communalism" (speaking personally, Ambedkar even asserted that "these village republics have been the ruination of India"). Yet even as he firmly rejected the possibility that democratic institutions from India's past could serve as appropriate contemporary models, Ambedkar did not fail to note the general relevance of the history of Indian public reasoning, and he particularly emphasized the expression of heterodox views and the historical criticism of the prevalence of inequality in India. There is a direct parallel here with Nelson Mandela's powerful invocation of Africa's own heritage of public reasoning in arguing for pluralist democracies in contemporary Africa.

III.

THE ESTABLISHED LITERATURE on the history of democracy is full of well-known contrasts between Plato and Aristotle, Marsilius of Padua and Machiavelli, Hobbes and Locke, and so on. This is as it should be; but the large intellectual heritages of China, Japan, East and Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, Iran, the Middle East, and Africa have been almost entirely neglected in analyzing the reach of the ideal of public reasoning. This has not favored an adequately inclusive understanding of the nature and the power of democratic ideas as they are linked to constructive public deliberation.

The ideal of public reasoning is closely linked with two particular social practices that deserve specific attention: the tolerance of different points of view (along with the acceptability of agreeing to disagree) and the encouragement of public discussion (along with endorsing the value of learning from others). Both tolerance and openness of public discussion are often seen as specific—and perhaps unique—features of Western tradition. How correct is this notion? Certainly, tolerance has by and large been a significant feature of modern Western politics (leaving out extreme aberrations like Nazi Germany and the intolerant administration of British or French or Portuguese empires in Asia and Africa). Still, there is hardly a great historical divide here of the kind that could separate out Western toleration from non-Western despotism. When the Jewish philosopher Maimonides was forced to emigrate from an intolerant Europe in the twelfth century, for example, he found a tolerant refuge in the Arab world and was given an honored and influential position in the court of Emperor Saladin in Cairo—the same Saladin who fought hard for Islam in the Crusades.

Maimonides's experience was not exceptional. Even though the contemporary world is full of examples of conflicts between Muslims and Jews, Muslim rulers in the Arab world and in medieval Spain had a long history of integrating Jews as secure members of the social community

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

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whose liberties—and sometimes leadership roles—were respected. As María Rosa Menocal notes in her recent book *The Ornament of the World,* the fact that Cordoba in Muslim-ruled Spain in the tenth century was "as serious a contender as Baghdad, perhaps more so, for the title of most civilized place on earth" was due to the joint influence of Caliph Abd al-Rahman III and his Jewish vizier Hasdai ibn Shaprut. Indeed, there is considerable evidence, as Menocal argues, that the position of Jews after the Muslim conquest "was in every respect an improvement, as they went from persecuted to protected minority."

Similarly, when in the 1590s the great Mughal emperor Akbar, with his belief in pluralism and in the constructive role of public discussions, was making his pronouncements in India on the need for tolerance and was busy arranging dialogues between people of different faiths (including Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Parsees, Jains, Jews, and even atheists), the inquisitions were still taking place in Europe with considerable vehemence. Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake for heresy in the Campo dei Fiori in Rome in 1600 even as Akbar was speaking on tolerance in Agra.

WE MUST NOT FALL INTO the trap of arguing that there was in general more tolerance in non-Western societies than in the West. For no such generalization can be made. There were great examples of tolerance as well as of intolerance on both sides of this allegedly profound division of the world. What needs to be corrected is the underresearched assertion of Western exceptionalism in the matter of tolerance; but there is no need to replace it with an equally arbitrary generalization of the opposite sort.

A similar point can be made about the tradition of public discussion. Again, the Greek and Roman heritage on this is particularly important for the history of public reasoning, but it was not unique in this respect in the ancient world. The importance attached to public deliberation by Buddhist intellectuals not only led to extensive communications on religious and secular subjects in India and in East and Southeast Asia, but also produced some of the earliest open general meetings aimed specifically at settling disputes regarding different points of view. These Buddhist "councils," the first of which was held shortly after Gautama Buddha's death, were primarily concerned with resolving differences in religious principles and practices, but they dealt also with demands of social and civic duties, and they helped to establish the practice of open discussion on contentious issues.

The largest of these councils—the third—occurred, under the patronage of Emperor Ashoka in the third century B.C.E., in Pataliputra, then the capital of India, now called Patna (perhaps best known today as a source of a fine long-grain rice). Public discussion, without violence or even animosity, was particularly important for Ashoka's general belief in social deliberation, as is well reflected in the inscriptions that he placed on specially mounted stone pillars across India—and some outside it. The edict at Erragudi put the issue forcefully:

> ... the growth of essentials of Dharma [proper conduct] is possible in many ways. But its root lies in restraint in regard to speech, so that there should be no extolment of one's own sect or disparagement of other sects on inappropriate occasions, and it should be moderate even on appropriate occasions. On the contrary, other sects should be duly honoured in every way on all occasions.... If a person acts otherwise, he not only injures his own sect but also harms other sects. Truly, if a person extols his own sect and disparages other sects with a view to glorifying his own sect owing merely to his attachment to it, he injures his own sect very severely by acting in that way.

ON THE SUBJECT of public discussion and communication, it is also important to note that nearly every attempt at early printing in China, Korea, and Japan was undertaken by Buddhist technologists, with an interest in expanding communication. The first printed book in the world was a Chinese translation of an Indian Sanskrit treatise, later known as the "Diamond Sutra," done by a half-Indian and half-Turkish scholar called Kumarajeeva in the fifth century, which was printed in China four and half centuries later, in 868 C.E. The development of printing, largely driven by a commitment to propagate Buddhist perspectives (including compassion and benevolence), transformed the possibilities of public communication in general. Initially sought as a medium for spreading the Buddhist message, the innovation of printing was a momentous development in public communication that greatly expanded the opportunity of social deliberation.

The commitment of Buddhist scholars to expand communication in secular as well as religious subjects has considerable relevance for the global roots of democracy. Sometimes the communication took the form of a rebellious disagreement. Indeed, in the seventh century Fu-yi, a Confucian leader of an anti-Buddhist campaign, submitted the following complaint about Buddhists to the Tang emperor (almost paralleling the current official ire about the "indiscipline" of the Falun Gong): "Buddhism infiltrated into China from Central Asia, under a strange and barbarous form, and as such, it was then less dangerous. But since the Han period the Indian texts began to be translated into Chinese. Their publicity began to adversely affect the faith of the Princes and filial piety began to degenerate. The people began to shave their heads and refused to bow their heads to the Princes and their ancestors." In other cases, the

Enclave

Our shape on the map is
Gynaecological, a bad drawing
Of the tight way in to a bulb
Of living space. How do we live?
Dumbly in our speech bubble.
We listen to the guard dogs and the warning shots.
The searchlights feel around our bedroom walls.
Our remaining romantics
Creep to the entrance on summer nights,
Lie in the close there, it is an ancient thicket,
And weep deliciously for the final nightingales.
But most we wife-swap, hose the lawn,
Flick like fleas all over the world
For breaking stories. Hard to believe
We are the temptation. Pity the poor brutes
  if they still think us
The womb of better times.

DAVID CONSTANTINE

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dialectics took the form of learning from each other. In fact, in the extensive scientific, mathematical, and literary exchanges between China and India during the first millennium C.E., Buddhist scholars played a major part.

In Japan in the early seventh century, the Buddhist Prince Shotoku, who was regent to his mother Empress Suiko, not only sent missions to China to bring back knowledge of art, architecture, astronomy, literature, and religion (including Taoist and Confucian texts in addition to Buddhist ones), but also introduced a relatively liberal constitution or *kempo,* known as "the constitution of seventeen articles," in 604 C.E. It insisted, much in the spirit of the Magna Carta (signed in England six centuries later), that "decisions on important matters should not be made by one person alone. They should be discussed with many." It also advised: "Nor let us be resentful when others differ from us. For all men have hearts, and each heart has its own leanings. Their right is our wrong, and our right is their wrong." Not surprisingly, many commentators have seen in this seventh-century constitution what Nakamura Hajime has called Japan's "first step of gradual development toward democracy."

There are, in fact, many manifestations of a firm commitment to public communication and associative reasoning that can be found in different places and times across the world. To take another illustration, which is of particular importance to science and culture, the great success of Arab civilization in the millennium following the emergence of Islam provides a remarkable example of indigenous creativity combined with openness to intellectual influences from elsewhere—often from people with very different religious beliefs and political systems. The Greek classics had a profound influence on Arab thinking, and, over a more specialized area, so did Indian mathematics. Even though no formal system of democratic governance was involved in these achievements, the excellence of what was achieved—the remarkable flourishing of Arab philosophy, literature, mathematics, and science—is a tribute not only to indigenous creativity but also to the glory of open public reasoning, which influences knowledge and technology as well as politics.

The idea behind such openness was well articulated by Imam Ali bin abi Taleb in the early seventh century, in his pronouncement that "no wealth can profit you more than the mind" and "no isolation can be more desolate than conceit." These and other such proclamations are quoted for their relevance to the contemporary world by the excellent "Arab Human Development Report 2002" of the United Nations. The thesis of European exceptionalism, by contrast, invites the Arabs, like the rest of the non-Western world, to forget their own heritage of public reasoning.

IV.

To ignore the centrality of public reasoning in the idea of democracy not only distorts and diminishes the history of democratic ideas, it also detracts attention from the interactive processes through which a democracy functions and on which its success depends. The neglect of the global roots of public reasoning, which is a big loss in itself, goes with the undermining of an adequate understanding of the place and the role of democracy in the contemporary world. Even with the expansion of adult franchise and fair elections, free and uncensored deliberation is important for people to be able to determine what they must demand, what they should criticize, and how they ought to vote.

Consider the much-discussed proposition that famines do not occur in democracies, but only in imperial colonies (as used to happen in British India), or in military dictatorships (as in Ethiopia, Sudan, or Somalia, in recent decades), or in one-party states (as in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, or China from 1958 to 1961, or Cambodia in the 1970s, or North Korea in the immediate past). It is hard for a government to withstand public criticism when a famine occurs. This is due not merely to the fear of losing elections, but also to the prospective consequences of public censure when newspapers and other media are independent and uncensored and opposition parties are allowed to pester those in office. The proportion of people affected by famines is always rather small (hardly ever more than 10 percent of the total population), so for a famine to become a political nightmare for the government it is necessary to generate public sympathy through the sharing of information and open public discussion.

Even though India was experiencing famines until its independence in 1947—the last one, the Bengal famine of 1943, killed between two and three million people—these catastrophes stopped abruptly when a multi-party democracy was established. China, by contrast, had the largest famine in recorded history between 1958 and 1961, in which it is estimated that between twenty-three and thirty million people died, following the debacle of collectivization in the so-called "Great Leap Forward." Still, the working of democracy, which is almost effortlessly effective in preventing conspicuous disasters such as famines, is often far less successful in politicizing the nastiness of regular but non-extreme undernourishment and ill health. India has had no problem in avoiding famines with timely intervention, but it has been much harder to generate adequate public interest in less immediate and less dramatic deprivations, such as the quiet presence of endemic but non-extreme hunger across the country and the low standard of basic health care.

While democracy is not without success in India, its achievements are still far short of what public reasoning can do in a democratic society if it addresses less conspicuous deprivations such as endemic hunger. A similar criticism can also be made about the protection of minority rights, which majority rule does not guarantee until and unless public discussion gives these rights enough political visibility and status to produce general public support. This certainly did not happen in the state of Gujarat last year, when politically engineered anti-Muslim riots led to unprecedented Hindu sectarian militancy and an electoral victory for the Hindu-chauvinist state government. How scrupulously secularism and minority rights will be guarded in India will depend on the reach and the vigor of public discussion on this subject. If democracy is construed not merely in terms of public balloting, but also in the more general form of public reasoning, then what is required is a strengthening of democracy, not a weakening of it.

To point to the need for more probing and more vigorous public reasoning even in countries that formally have democratic institutions must not be seen as a counsel of despair. People can and do respond to generally aired concerns and appeals to tolerance and humanity, and this is part of the role of public reasoning. Indeed, it is not easy to dismiss the possibility that to a limited extent just such

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a response may be occurring in India in the wake of the Gujarat riots and the victory of Hindu sectarianism in the Gujarat elections in December 2002. The engineered success in Gujarat did not help the Bharatiya Janata Party, or BJP, in the state elections in the rest of India that followed the Gujarat elections. The BJP lost in all four state elections held in early 2003, but the defeat that was particularly significant occurred in the state of Himachal Pradesh, where the party had actually been in office but was routed this time, winning only sixteen seats against the Congress Party's forty. Moreover, a Muslim woman from the Congress Party won the mayoral election in Ahmadabad, where some of the worst anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat had occurred only a few months earlier. Much will depend on the breadth and the energy of public reasoning in the future—an issue that takes us back to the arguments presented by exponents of public reasoning in India's past, including Ashoka and Akbar, whose analyses remain thoroughly relevant today.

THE COMPLEX ROLE OF PUBLIC reasoning can also be seen in the comparisons between China's and India's achievements in the field of health care and longevity over recent decades. This happens to be a subject that has interested Chinese and Indian public commentators over millennia. While Faxian (Fa-Hien), a fifth-century Chinese visitor who spent ten years in India, wrote admiringly in effusive detail about the arrangements for public health care in Pataliputra, a later visitor who came to India in the seventh century, Yi Jing (I-Ching), argued in a more competitive vein that "in the healing arts of acupuncture and cautery and the skill of feeling the pulse, China has never been surpassed [by India]; the medicament for prolonging life is only found in China." There was also considerable discussion in India on *chinachar*—Chinese practice—in different fields when the two countries were linked by Buddhism.

By the middle of the twentieth century, China and India had about the same life expectancy at birth, around forty-five years or so. But post-revolution China, with its public commitment to improve health care and education (a commitment that was carried over from its days of revolutionary struggle), brought a level of dedication in radically enhancing health care that the more moderate Indian administration could not at all match. By the time the economic reforms were introduced in China in 1979, China had a lead of thirteen years or more over India in longevity, with the Chinese life expectancy at sixty-seven years, while India's was less than fifty-four years. Still, even though the radical economic reforms introduced in China in 1979 ushered in a period of extraordinary economic growth, the government slackened on the public commitment to health care, and in particular replaced automatic and free health insurance by the need to buy private insurance at one's own cost (except when provided by one's employer, which happens only in a small minority of cases). This largely retrograde movement in the coverage of health care met with little public resistance (as it undoubtedly would have in a multi-party democracy), even though it almost certainly had a role in slowing down the progress of Chinese longevity. In India, by contrast, unsatisfactory health services have come more and more under public scrutiny and general condemnation, with some favorable changes being forced on the services offered.

Despite China's much faster rate of growth since the economic reforms, the rate of expansion of life expectancy in India has been about three times as fast, on the average, as that in China. China's life expectancy, which is now just about seventy years, compares with India's figure of sixty-three years, so that the life-expectancy gap in favor of China has been nearly halved, to seven years, over the last two decades. But note must be taken of the fact that it gets increasingly harder to expand life expectancy further as the absolute level rises, and it could be argued that perhaps China has now reached a level at which further expansion would be exceptionally difficult. Yet this explanation does not work, since China's life expectancy of seventy years is still very far below the figures for many countries in the world—indeed, even parts of India.

At the time of the economic reforms, when China had a life expectancy of about sixty-seven years, the Indian state of Kerala had a similar figure. By now, however, Kerala's life expectancy of seventy-four years is considerably above China's seventy years. Going further, if we look at specific points of vulnerability, the infant-mortality rate in China has fallen very slowly since the economic reforms, whereas it has continued to fall extremely sharply in Kerala. While Kerala had roughly the same infant mortality rate as China—thirty-seven per thousand—in 1979, Kerala's present rate, between thirteen and fourteen per thousand, is considerably less than half of China's thirty per thousand (where it has stagnated over the last decade). It appears that Kerala, with its background of egalitarian politics, has been able to benefit further from continued public reasoning protected by a democratic system. The latter on its own would seem to have helped India to narrow the gap with China quite sharply, despite the failings of the Indian health services that are widely discussed in the press. Indeed, the fact that so much is known—and in such detail—about the inadequacies of Indian health care from criticisms in the press is itself a contribution to improving the existing state of affairs.

The informational role of democracy, working mainly through open public discussion, can be pivotally important. It is the limitation of this informational feature that has come most sharply to attention in the context of the recent SARS epidemic. Although cases of SARS first appeared in southern China in November 2002 and caused many fatalities, information about the deadly new disease was kept under wraps until this April. Indeed, it was only when that highly infectious disease started spreading to Hong Kong and Beijing that the news had to be released, and by then the epidemic had already gone beyond the possibility of isolation and local elimination. The lack of open public discussion evidently played a critical part in the spread of the SARS epidemic in particular, but the general issue has a much wider relevance.

V.

THE VALUE OF PUBLIC REASONing applies to reasoning about democracy itself. It is good that the practices of democracy have been sharply scrutinized in the literature on world affairs, for there are identifiable deficiencies in the performance of many countries that have the standard democratic institutions. Not only is public discussion of these deficiencies an effective means of trying to remedy them, but this is exactly how democracy in the form of public reasoning is meant to function. In this sense, the defects of democracy demand more democracy, not less.

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The alternative—trying to cure the defects of democratic practice through authoritarianism and the suppression of public reasoning—increases the vulnerability of a country to sporadic disasters (including, in many cases, famine), and also to the whittling away of previously secured gains through a lack of public vigilance (as seems to have happened, to some extent, in Chinese health care). There is also a genuine loss of political freedom and restrictions of civil rights in even the best-performing authoritarian regimes, such as Singapore or pre-democratic South Korea; and, furthermore, there is no guarantee that the suppression of democracy would make, say, India more like Singapore than like Sudan or Afghanistan, or more like South Korea than like North Korea.

Seeing democracy in terms of public reasoning, as "government by discussion," also helps us to identify the far-reaching historical roots of democratic ideas across the world. The apparent Western modesty that takes the form of a humble reluctance to promote "Western ideas of democracy" in the non-Western world includes an imperious appropriation of a global heritage as exclusively the West's own. The self-doubt with regard to "pushing" Western ideas on non-Western societies is combined with the absence of doubt in viewing democracy as a quintessentially Western idea, an immaculate Western conception.

This misappropriation results from gross neglect of the intellectual history of non-Western societies, but also from the conceptual defect in seeing democracy primarily in terms of balloting, rather than in the broader perspective of public reasoning. A fuller understanding of the demands of democracy and of the global history of democratic ideas may contribute substantially to better political practice today. It may also help to remove some of the artificial cultural fog that obscures the appraisal of current affairs. ■

Lynn Hunt
Great Reception

GEORGE WASHINGTON'S FALSE TEETH: AN UNCONVENTIONAL GUIDE TO THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
By Robert Darnton
(W.W. Norton, 208 pp., $23.95)

ROBERT DARNTON HAS A knack for breaking open an old chestnut and finding the meat still clinging inside. The chestnut in question is usually the Enlightenment, the eighteenth-century intellectual movement that aimed to subject everything to reasoned criticism. As its great impresario Denis Diderot put it, "All things must be examined, debated, investigated without exception and without regard for anyone's feelings." It sounds banal now, until you remember that "anyone" meant the authorities of church and state who routinely banned books and put dissidents such as Diderot himself in prison. "All things" turned out to include bigotry, superstition, fanaticism, intolerance, judicial torture, inequities of taxation, and a host of other issues bound to offend official sensibilities. Darnton never forgets that intellectual freedom in the West came at a price, and in many places in the world it still does. He has made it his mission to bring the Enlightenment to life, to show how it worked, and to demonstrate its continuing salience in a world in which bigotry, superstition, fanaticism, and related evils have hardly disappeared.

When an illustrious scholar gathers together occasional pieces into a volume, the result is often less rather than more, a dilution of powerful ideas in the interest of making the most of every talk given outside the classroom. Some of the pieces in this volume do qualify as Darnton lite, but most do not. The opening essay, the most substantial in the book, offers a powerful rejoinder to anyone who considers the Enlightenment somehow passé. In it Darnton gives voice to his most profound intellectual convictions: that Enlightenment was a cause that galvanized intellectuals committed to tolerance, skepticism, individualism, civil liberty, and cosmopolitanism, and that its values have proved to be the most potent defense against the various forms of inhumanity that we have experienced in our world. In holding this view, Darnton follows in the footsteps of his greatest twentieth-century predecessors, Paul Hazard, Ernst Cassirer, and more recently Peter Gay. Forced to confront the evils of fascism—and in the case of Cassirer and Gay, compelled to leave Germany because they were Jews—these scholars used their writings to make the Enlightenment into the touchstone of Western liberal thought.

Had it not always been so? The original publicists of Enlightenment—Voltaire, Diderot, Beccaria, Franklin, Lessing, Kant, and many others like them—thought of themselves as comrades in an international movement for liberty. But they had not envisaged the French Revolution, and they could not imagine how the Revolution would change their image. Enlightenment figures who lived through the revolutionary upheaval came to feel deeply ambivalent about it. Radicals found them too politically moderate, while conservatives blamed them for the Revolution's violence and terror. When a republic finally took hold in France after the 1870s, it claimed Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Rousseau as its forefathers, but elsewhere in the Western world their work and their legend had much less resonance. In Spain they were still too "atheist," in the Netherlands and Great Britain they were too French, and even in the United States they seemed irrelevant in comparison with Locke and various oppositional figures in British politics.

Fascism changed all that by celebrating an explicitly irrationalist, hypernationalist, and anti-cosmopolitan ideology: by acting on what Isaiah Berlin called the Counter-Enlightenment. And so anti-fascist intellectuals on both shores of the Atlantic looked to histories of the Enlightenment to articulate common Western values of intellectual freedom and individual rights. Cassirer published *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* in 1932; Hazard published his book on the origins of the movement in 1935 and finished his general history just before his death in wartime France in 1944. Anti-fascism now had an intellectual lineage, and the Enlightenment had be-

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come synonymous with modern Western culture.

DARNTON IS A CHILD OF A different era, who could initially take the virtues of the Enlightenment for granted. In his first book, *Mesmerism and the End of the Enlightenment in France* (1968), he explored the Parisian vogue in the 1780s for the "animal magnetism" of the Vienna-trained physician Franz Anton Mesmer. Darnton portrayed a high society in necrosis, thrilling to quacks and adventurers, unmoved by the poor and the rapidly escalating financial crisis of the monarchy. The Enlightenment had run its course; the greats had passed from the scene (Voltaire and Rousseau died in 1778), and their epigones grubbed for a living writing scandal sheets about the powerful and the high-born. Darnton never focused on the ideas of the Enlightenment itself. He wanted to show how those ideas diffused outward and downward, and above all he was fascinated by the low life of literature, the publishers and the smugglers of forbidden books, the pamphleteers and the pornographers who gnawed away at the beams holding up the ancien régime. Darnton has done more than anyone else to illuminate this story and to show how it matters. *The Business of Enlightenment* (1979) and *The Forbidden Best-Sellers of Pre-Revolutionary France* (1995) are rightly considered classics in the field.

By the mid-1990s, however, it became clear that the virtues of the Enlightenment could no longer be taken for granted. "The Case for the Enlightenment," first published in 1997 and now the opening essay of Darnton's new book, has a defensive tone. In it he argues against postmodernist, feminist, and anti-imperialist critics from within the Western tradition. The Enlightenment writers, he grants, were elite men, not peasants, workers, or, for the most part, women. They talked about universal values while making fun of the Persians and the Chinese and doing little to stop slavery or colonial exploitation and nothing at all for the rights of women. Reason was an article of faith for them, just as Christianity was an article of faith for others. All true, Darnton admits, since the men of Enlightenment were after all men of their times. But the *philosophes* also criticized slavery and colonial exploitation, and opened the way to an anthropological understanding of other peoples, and rejected most of the elements of modern racism, and defended notions of reason and rights that are the only possible barriers to terror, torture, or totalitarianism.

There is nothing wrong with such a defense, except that it already seems out of date—as does Darnton's ending to this chapter, when he suggests that we emulate George Washington and "face up to the injustices around us by gritting our teeth." Washington had a hard time gritting his teeth because he wore false ones made of wood. But our problems cannot be solved in a dentist's chair. Even before September 11, the postmodernist, feminist, and anti-imperialist accusations against the Enlightenment had been widely recognized as specious. That David Hume uttered what we now piously categorize as racist remarks does not make the Enlightenment the source of modern racism. It is incontrovertibly the case that the foremost proponents of feminism, anti-imperialism, and even abolitionism were disciples of the Enlightenment. In the wake of the destruction of the World Trade Center, the left-wing anti-Enlightenment diatribes of the last two decades seem almost frivolous. What the world needs now is an army of Voltaires, not an army of Voltaire-bashers. An equal-opportunity satirist himself, Voltaire ridiculed European and non-Western customs alike. We may think that he wrote too harshly or dismissively about "the other," but we could do with a dose of his willingness to subject every custom—ours and theirs—to the inspection of reason.

AN ARMY OF VOLTAIRES CAN be raised only when the material conditions are in place. The second essay in Darnton's book, "The News in Paris: An Early Information Society," brilliantly showcases his method of getting at the circulation of ideas. It is deeply researched, bursting with telling anecdotes, and very accessible to the reader, like the news itself. How did ordinary people get news in a society with no daily newspapers and two hundred censors who forbade the publication of political criticism? They could try to read between the lines of officially approved newspapers or subscribe to earnest foreign ones, but more titillating sources were on offer. Self-appointed newsmongers told stories in public gardens and recounted gossip in cafes; hand-copied newsletters, songs, and poems satirized the king's mistresses and ministers; *romans à clef,* which often came with keys to decoding the characters, lambasted courtiers and officials of all descriptions.

Throughout his career, Darnton has managed to transform the potentially dreary details of "reception history" into the stuff of spy novels. Consider the example of a song attacking Louis XV, which began with the line "Monster whose black fury." Darnton traces it from the moment that the police in Paris are ordered to find its author. With the help of a well-paid informant, they arrest a medical student who under interrogation says that he got the song from a priest, who in turn names another priest, and so on down the line through a law student and a notary's clerk, until fourteen men are picked up. Questioning of the suspects reveals that the song had been passed from hand to hand on scraps of paper, periodically revised in bull sessions, and even dictated from memory to students at the University of Paris, until it finally made its way into one of those pesky handwritten gazettes that specialized in rumors and conspiracies. Many Parisians collected these songs and poems. The most avid collector of all was Comte de Maurepas, Louis XV's minister of the navy, who had thirty-five handwritten registers of such songs; he was fired and sent into exile for his interest in songs ridiculing the king's mistress, Madame de Pompadour. Authoritarian rulers invariably end up finding their cronies aiding and abetting the dissidents.

Did dirty songs do more to sap the foundations of the monarchy than the writings of Voltaire or Rousseau? At times this seems to be Darnton's implication. He ends by insisting that "politics was an endless series of variations on a single theme, decadence and despotism." His sources more or less force him to this conclusion; if you want to follow the circulation of ideas, you must go to the police reports, and the police always gave priority to the most flamboyant kinds of political criticism, which in mid-eighteenth-century France meant attacks on the Catholic Church ("atheism") or on the king's closest confidants ("sedition"). When Darnton set out to discover which books sold best in late-eighteenth-century France, he found that Enlightenment works were outnumbered on the list by pornographic and scurrilous attacks on the monarchy. But would we really want to conclude that *Fanny Hill*

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had greater political influence than *The Social Contract* or *Émile* because none of Rousseau's books ever made the best-seller list?

Darnton has always taken a sensible middle-of-the-road position on the influence of the Enlightenment. Although he is rightly considered one of the pioneers of "the history of the book," which concentrates on the production and the circulation of books rather than on their intellectual content, he has resisted the tendency among its practitioners to downplay the impact of ideas. His essays in this book on Rousseau, Voltaire, Jefferson, and Condorcet demonstrate his continuing interest in the big fish, not just the small fry attracted to the muck of the political sewers. In one of the pieces on Rousseau, he even affirms that the Genevan's three main works—*Émile, The Social Contract,* and *Julie, or the New Heloïse*—"changed the course of cultural history." Just how they changed the course of cultural history is not clear, for Darnton never develops this point; he seems to mean that Rousseau, more than any other Enlightenment figure, understood the importance of symbolic forms of power; that democracy, as outlined by Rousseau, would require a new culture, fashioned through education and the festivals of a new civil religion. A fleeting reference to Ronald Reagan synchronizing his inauguration with the kickoff of the Super Bowl does not really serve to illuminate the point.

If Darnton's pages on the major Enlightenment figures are more flimsy than those on the circulation of scandalous songs and pamphlets, it is because the connection to the French Revolution is harder to establish in the case of the former than the latter. The not-so-hidden agenda of almost all Darnton's work has been to answer the perennial question of whether the Enlightenment caused the French Revolution. That question explains his unrepentantly Francocentric definition of the Enlightenment, his interest in the sleaze factor, and his lifelong fascination with Jacques-Pierre Brissot, sleazemonger turned revolutionary ideologist. Brissot turns up again and again in Darnton's work—he is mentioned here as often as Voltaire—and he has recently been the subject of an online publication by Darnton, *J.-P. Brissot and the Société Typographique de Neuchâtel* (2001), from the Voltaire Foundation. Brissot, unlike Rousseau or Voltaire, is the kind of figure who seems directly to link Enlightenment and Revolution. A twenty-four-year-old unknown when Voltaire and Rousseau died in 1778, Brissot clawed his way up from Grub Street to become a major advocate of penal reform. He spent time in the Bastille for his pains, and he may have spied for the king's police. He founded the first French abolitionist society, edited one of the most influential newspapers of 1789, exercised great influence as a deputy in the revolutionary legislature, and fell victim, like so many other republican leaders, to Robespierre's terror in 1793.

Darnton vividly recounts the ups and downs of Brissot's mercurial career before 1789. Despite his frantic efforts to cultivate patrons, get his name into print, and assure favorable reviews of his books, Brissot came out of the Bastille in 1784 overwhelmed with debt. An unscrupulous financier named Etienne Clavière helped him to recover by fronting the money for gambling on a drop in future stock prices. In return Brissot wrote pamphlets assailing government support of various banks and companies, claiming that the ministry deliberately shored up their assets in order to benefit those who put their money on share increases. These attacks helped to discredit the government at a time of growing financial crisis—and made Brissot and Clavière money. Brissot's Rousseauistic rhetoric, employed to denounce speculation and stock-jobbing, appears entirely cynical, though not without results. The controversy drove the king's chief financial minister from office. In 1792 Brissot repaid Clavière by naming him minister of finance. Clavière committed suicide rather than accompany Brissot to the guillotine in October 1793.

Although Darnton devotes nearly a third of this book to the wily wannabe *philosophe,* his focus on Brissot does not bring us any closer to understanding the links between Enlightenment and Revolution. Are we to conclude that most revolutionaries were hacks, police spies, and stock-market manipulators? The evidence does not support such a conclusion. Or was Brissot just an especially bad apple? Robespierre and his followers believed that "the Brissotins" and their ilk were financially corrupt and politically treasonous, but they had their own reasons for insisting on this characterization, and they caught up many innocent dissidents in the same all-purpose net. In any case, we do not know what Darnton wants to make of the Brissot case, because he never gets to the French Revolution and never compares Brissot to other revolutionaries. His conclusion is exasperating: "Was Brissot both a dedicated revolutionary and a crass spy for the police? God only knows."

Darnton does not pretend to have unraveled the complex interconnections between Enlightenment and Revolution. He subtitles his book "An Unconventional Guide to the Eighteenth Century," and though he claims to take us to the eighteenth century's "main concern, the cause of the Enlightenment," he prefers most often to discourse engagingly about "its most curious, out-of-the-way corners." For these curiosities, for the surprising twists and turns of irreverent songs, stock-market machinations, self-interested pamphleteering, and comical police chases after the purveyors of political insolence, Darnton is certainly the ideal tour guide. He calls his method "anthropological history," but it does not need such an academic-sounding label. It is good history, because it is so richly documented. It is also captivating history: reading Darnton you find yourself lingering at the Tree of Cracow, a leafy chestnut in the Palais-Royal gardens, listening to the latest rumors from the antechambers of Versailles. All the analysis in the world cannot fill in for the vivid sense of being there that is Robert Darnton's greatest gift to his readers. ■

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
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CAMBRIDGE DIARIST

The Ambassador

STILL JET-LAGGED FROM MY trip to Israel, I woke up before dawn and stumbled to my computer to read the news online. *Ha'aretz*, the more than somewhat leftish Israeli daily, is my home page, so I am assured of having my bile stimulated early in the day. Today, however, the face of my old friend Simha Dinitz stares out at me from the Web, and a cascade of thoughts course through my head. I had been with him and his wife, Vivian, at their house for Sabbath dinner only ten days ago, robust conversation at the table, true and truly hilarious reminiscences from the host's vivid memory. So, what has Simha done that is newsworthy? Has he been summoned back to the intricate diplomacy at which he so excelled? And, then, suddenly it dawns on me that the news is not of some unpredicted responsibility or overdue acknowledgement. The news is of his death.

SIMHA DINITZ WAS THE ISRAELI AMBASsador to the United States at what was probably the most precarious single moment in Israel's existence, which is saying something: the Yom Kippur War. I remember the dread well, and Henry Kissinger's new book, *Crisis*, confirms what we already knew, and more. Not just that Simha was almost always the person on the other end of Kissinger's phone during those terrible days in 1973, but that it was he who, by deftly mustering American political leadership in both parties to Israel's side, guaranteed the resupply of depleted weapons to the Jewish state. I do not mean to minimize the role of Kissinger himself, who acted decisively despite serving an otherwise preoccupied president who was not especially well-disposed to Israel or to Jews. Still, one comes away from *Crisis* puzzling over which of the two diplomatic principals did their job more sagely—both grasping, of course, that Israel had to win the war and that Egypt had to lose the war in a way that did not preclude a future peace. Rabbi Judah remarks in the Talmud that "there are those who secure their place in the hereafter in a single hour," that is, with one great stroke, with a single magnificent deed. Simha's deeds were many, but I like to imagine that he is telling the celestial tribunal the tale of his actions in Washington in 1973. The tribunal should be satisfied.

GOLDA MEIR PLUCKED SIMHA FROM the lower echelons of Israel's diplomatic service, appointing him Israel's fifth ambassador in Washington, where he succeeded Yitzhak Rabin. I knew Golda through Simha, and I know what she saw in him. He did not edit the information he gave her. He brought her bad news as well as good. She trusted him. Reading Kissinger's book, it is clear the American secretary of state trusted him, too. Simha was a stellar public spokesman, riveting in narrative, evocative in affect. He made friends for Israel as no ambassador has done since. In a way, he was one of Golda's achievements.

WHEN I SAW HIM ONLY DAYS AGO, WE spoke about Golda's reviving reputation, which has been under attack by the Peace Nowniks for more than two decades. Golda's reputation is intertwined with Simha's and, more broadly, with the reputation of a bygone force in Israeli politics: hawkish Labor. Neither Golda nor Simha dreamed of greater Israel. Unlike the settlements that Rabin and Shimon Peres established on the West Bank, their settlements would have been built not in the Arab heartland but on the vulnerable frontiers, widening the constricted turf on the heavily populated Mediterranean coast and building a buffer on the Jordan River between the Palestinians and the Arab world beyond. Neither had any illusions about the Arabs of Palestine. Under the best of circumstances, both Golda and Simha would say, Israel is doomed to live dangerously. They were not militarists; they were realists.

SIMHA STAYED ON AS MENACHEM BEGIN'S ambassador to Washington, and—as historians tell us—helped to overcome his prime minister's congenital distrust of Arab intentions. Simha recognized that Anwar Sadat was different, that he had liberated himself from the doctrinal delusions of Gamal Abdel Nasser, and that, in any event, Egypt had been bled dry by its foolish enmeshment in pan-Arabism. So Simha was among those who toiled at the first Camp David summit in 1978, the one that actually achieved something.

THEN HE WENT HOME TO JERUSALEM, where he would ultimately head the Jewish Agency, that idiosyncratic expression of world Zionism. In this post he presided over the return of two vastly disparate Jewries, the Jews of the former Soviet Union and the Jews of Ethiopia. Both were in the process of disappearing. In Russia, where throngs of Jews had braved the secret police in the streets to welcome Golda when she came to Moscow as ambassador in 1949, men and women still went to prison for studying Hebrew 25 years later. In Ethiopia, the persecution of the *falashas* (itself an anti-Jewish epithet) was of consequence to no one besides a few Jews living far away. Simha brought to the vast enterprise of homecoming his peculiar combination of passion and diplomatic dexterity. He genuinely considered the returnees his brothers and his sisters. Their ingathering, a million from one place and 150,000 from another, also puts me in mind of Rabbi Judah's promise of the hereafter.

IN ISRAEL, SAD TO SAY, THE "POLITICS of personal destruction" is routine. Nothing in Washington comes close. In the end, Simha was one of its victims. Ten years ago, a coarse Likud member of parliament, Limor Livnat, now minister of education, launched what I have always considered a witch-hunt into my friend's small finances. He was indicted, convicted, and fined. Four years of his life were absorbed defending his honor, and he seemed to have been defeated. But then the Supreme Court overturned his conviction, and not on some tiny technical grounds, either. Legally, Simha was vindicated. Personally, he was a wounded man.

STILL, JUSTICE HAS ITS SAY EVEN AT death. Simha Dinitz's funeral will be held on Mount Herzl, where Theodor Herzl and the other founders and guardians of the state are interred. This is not exactly a place in the hereafter, but, in the one world of whose existence we are certain, in this harsh and inspiring terrestrial world, it is a form of immortality. Blessed is the truthful judge.

MARTIN PERETZ

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Co[illegible] Schools Benefits All Students

erbert J. Walberg is a
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The federal No Child Left Behind Act introduces two key elements of competitive markets to K–12 education: the freedom to choose among schools, with access to schools, annual performance measures, and the potential for change, as suggested by what has happened since similar policies were introduced in Florida and the United Kingdom.

Under Florida's A-Plus Program, every public school receives an annual grade on its academic performance. If a school receives two F grades within a four-year period, parents may send their child to another higher-graded public school or to a private school. **Recent reports show that parents get more involved with their schools if they have information readily available on school performance.**

For example, within weeks of receiving two consecutive F grades this June, more than 15 percent of the students at Jones High School in Orlando elected to leave the school. Two F ratings at Jean Ribault High School in Jacksonville caused a similar percentage of students to leave. Enrollments have dropped at all twenty-eight F-rated schools in Miami-Dade County and at all seven F-rated schools in Orange County.

Although studies show the competition generated by the A-Plus Program has raised achievement levels in Florida's public schools, critics still raise concerns about the most difficult-to-teach students accumulating in lower-performing schools and such schools becoming even worse. Evidence from the United Kingdom, however, indicates that school choice produces an upward shift in achievement even in low-performing schools with high concentrations of low-income students.

In 1988, the Education Reform Act was passed to introduce "quasi-market forces" to public education in the United Kingdom. The reforms gave parents more choice over selecting their children's schools; made school funding dependent on student enrollment; and gave individual schools more authority over deploying resources.

In addition, each school's academic performance on national examinations was ranked annually in widely published *School Performance Tables*. As Lancaster University economists Steve Bradley and Jim Taylor note in a recent report from the Adam Smith Institute, "exam performance is one of the critical variables determining school choice and is therefore used by parents as a key performance indicator."

To assess the effect of the 1988 reforms, Bradley and Taylor analyzed data for 3,000 public schools from 1992 to 2000. They concluded that the reforms had created a "rudimentary" market in education, with the resulting competition among schools producing the following effects: parents, seeking higher quality, moved their children to local schools with higher performance rankings, and **academic performance levels increased across the board as schools vied to outperform one another to gain parental approval**. The results showed that students from all social levels (including poor students) increased significantly over the eight-year period.

The Florida and UK research corroborates other studies showing the benefits of implementing market reforms in public schools. Markets appear to be just what our education system needs to promote effectiveness and efficiency.

— Herbert J. Walberg

Paid for by the Hoover Institution, Stanford University



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

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